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Peru

Executive Summary

Peru was one of the fastest growing Latin American economies between 2004 and 2013, growing at an average rate of 6 percent per year.  Though growth slowed from 2014-2018, the country recovered and grew by 4 percent in 2018, significantly higher than the estimated 1.2 percent regional average.  The government’s counter-cyclical stimulus spending, consumption, and private investment are the driving forces of this growth. Private investment totaled USD 41 billion in 2018.  As the economy has grown, poverty in Peru has decreased, falling from 56 percent in 2005 to 20.5 percent in 2018. President Martin Vizcarra aims to increase private investment by fostering strong public investment, streamlining administrative processes, and reducing bureaucracy, while addressing corruption and social conflict.

The Government of Peru (GOP) has encouraged integration with the global economy by signing a number of free trade agreements, including the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA), which entered into force in February 2009.  In 2018, trade of goods between the United States and Peru totaled USD 17.5 billion, up from USD 9.1 billion in 2009, the year the PTPA entered into force. From 2009 to 2018, Peruvian exports of goods to the United States jumped from USD 4.2 billion to USD 7.9 billion (a 88 percent increase) while U.S. exports of goods to Peru jumped from USD 4.9 billion to USD 9.6 billion (a 96 percent increase).  The United States also enjoys a favorable trade balance in services; exports of services in 2016 to Peru amounted to USD 2.7 billion and contributed to a USD 1.1 billion services surplus the same year.

Corruption and social conflicts around extractive projects continue to negatively affect Peru’s investment climate.  Transparency International ranked Peru 105th out of 180 countries in its 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index. In 2016, Brazilian company Odebrecht admitted it had paid USD 29 million in bribes in Peru, leading to investigations involving high-level officials of the last four Peruvian administrations and halting progress on major infrastructure projects.  Odebrecht agreed to pay Peru USD 180 million in civil reparation in December 2018. According to the Ombudsman, there were 132 active social conflicts in Peru as of March 2019, of which 71 befell mining projects.

  • Extractive industries are a key draw of foreign investment.  According to Peru’s Private Investment Promotion Agency (ProInversion), 22 percent of foreign direct investment in 2018 went to the mining sector, 21 percent to the communications sector, and 18 percent to the financial sector.  Other destinations for investment included energy (13 percent) and industry (12 percent).

Table 1

Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 105 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
World Bank’s Doing Business Report “Ease of Doing Business” 2018 68 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings
Global Innovation Index 2018 71 of 126 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator
U.S. FDI in partner country (M USD, stock positions) 2017 $6, 400 http://www.bea.gov/international/factsheet/
World Bank GNI per capita 2017 $5,960 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD

3. Legal Regime

Transparency of the Regulatory System

Laws and regulations most relevant to foreign investors are enacted and implemented at the national level.  Most ministries and agencies make draft regulations available for public comment. El Peruano, the state’s official gazette, publishes regulations at the national, regional, and municipal level.  Ministries generally maintain current regulations on their websites. Rule-making and regulatory authority also exists through executive agencies specific to different sectors. The Supervisory Agency for Forest Resources and Wildlife (OSINFOR), the Supervisory Agency for Energy and Mining (OSINERGMIN), and the Supervisory Agency for Telecommunications (OSIPTEL) can enact new regulations that affect investments in the economic sectors they manage.  These agencies also have the remit to enforce regulations with penalties varying by sector, with information on enforcement published. Enforcement actions can be appealed through administrative processes. Regulation is reviewed on the basis of scientific and data-driven assessments, but public comments are not always received or made public.

Accounting, legal, and regulatory standards are consistent with international norms.  Peru’s Accounting Standards Council endorses the use of IFRS standards by private entities.

International Regulatory Considerations

Peru is a member of regional economic blocs.  The Andean Community issues supranational regulations – based on consensus of its members – which supersede domestic provisions.  Under the Pacific Alliance, Peru looks to harmonize regulations and reduce barriers to trade with other members: Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.

Legal System and Judicial Independence

Peru has an independent judiciary.  The executive branch does not interfere with the judiciary as a matter of policy.  Peru is in the process of transitioning to an accusatory legal system. The new system is already in place in the regions outside Lima.  Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable through administrative process and the court system.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

Peru’s legal system is available to investors.  All laws relevant to foreign investment along with pertinent explanations and forms can be found on the ProInversion website at: http://www.ProInversion.gob.pe/modulos/LAN/landing.aspx?are=1&pfl=1&lan=9&tit=institucional  

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

The Institute for the Protection of Intellectual Property, Consumer Protection, and Competition (INDECOPI) is the GOP agency responsible for reviewing competition-related concerns of a domestic nature.  In 2016, INDECOPI levied sanctions against a U.S. company and its Chilean counterpart for fixing the price of toilet paper in Peru. The Peruvian Congress is evaluating a bill that would require prior approval by INDECOPI for mergers and acquisitions with the goal of eliminating anticompetitive practices.

Expropriation and Compensation

Congress passed a law streamlining expropriation procedures in August 2015.  The GOP announced in January 2017 that it would create a body within ProInversion to focus on acquiring land for infrastructure projects.  The Peruvian Constitution states that the GOP can only expropriate private property on the basis of public interest, such as public works projects or for national security.  In order to expropriate, Congress is required to pass a legislative decree. The Government of Peru has expressed its intention to comply with international standards concerning expropriations.  Peruvian law bases compensation for expropriation on fair market value. Concessionaires have complained that the government has been slow in implementing expropriations, causing delays to their investment commitments.

Illegal expropriation of foreign investment has been alleged in the extractive industry.  A U.S. company alleged indirect expropriation due to changes in regulatory standards. Landowners have also alleged indirect expropriation due to government inaction and corruption in ‘land-grab’ cases that have at times been linked to local government endorsed projects.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

Peru is a party to the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) and to the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID convention).  Disputes between foreign investors and the GOP regarding pre-existing contracts must still enter national courts, unless otherwise permitted, such as through provisions found in the PTPA. In addition, investors who enter into a juridical stability agreement may submit disputes with the government to national or international arbitration if stipulated in the agreement.  Several private organizations – including the American Chamber of Commerce, the Lima Chamber of Commerce, and Universidad Catolica – operate private arbitration centers. The quality of such centers varies and investors should choose arbitration venues carefully.

The PTPA includes a chapter on dispute settlement, which applies to implementation of the Agreement’s core obligations, including labor and environment provisions.  Dispute panel procedures set high standards of openness and transparency through the following measures: open public hearings, public release of legal submissions by parties, admission of  special labor or environment expertise for disputes in these areas, and opportunities for interested third parties to submit views. The Agreement emphasizes compliance through consultation and trade-enhancing remedies.  The Agreement also encourages arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution measures for disputes between private parties.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

The PTPA provides investor-state claim mechanisms.  It does not require that an investor

exhaust local judicial or administrative remedies before a claim may be filed.  The investor may submit a claim under various arbitral mechanisms, including the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention) and ICSID Rules of Procedure, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules, or, if the disputants agree, any other arbitration institution or rules.  Peru has paid previous arbitral awards; however, a U.S. court found in one case that Peru altered its tax code prior to payment, thus reducing interest payments.

In 2011, a claimant filed an arbitral challenge against Peru stemming from the alleged failure by the state to undertake agreed-upon environmental remediation at a mining facility.  The arbitration was dismissed in 2016 on grounds of jurisdiction.

In February 2016, a U.S. investor filed a Notice of Intent to pursue international arbitration against the GOP for violation of the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement.  The investor, which refiled its claim in August 2016, holds agrarian land reform bonds it argues the GOP has undervalued.

There is no recent history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

The 1993 Constitution allows disputes among foreign investors and the government or state-controlled enterprises to be submitted to international arbitration.  The Supreme Court ruled in 2005 that all arbitration awards are final and are not subject to appeal.

Bankruptcy Regulations

Peru has a creditor rights hierarchy similar to that established under U.S. bankruptcy law, and monetary judgments are usually made in the currency stipulated in the contract.  However, administrative bankruptcy procedures under INDECOPI (the Antitrust, Unfair Competition, Intellectual Property Protection, Consumer Protection, Dumping, Standards and Elimination of Bureaucratic Barriers Agency) have proven to be slow and subject to judicial intervention.  Compounding this difficulty are occasional laws passed to protect specific debtors from action by creditors that would force them into bankruptcy or liquidation. In August 2016, the GOP extended the period for bankruptcy from one to two years. Peru does not criminalize bankruptcy.  World Bank’s 2018 Doing Business Report ranked Peru 88th of 190 countries for ease of “resolving insolvency.”

6. Financial Sector

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

The GOP allows foreign portfolio investment.  Neither the GOP nor its Central Bank place restrictions on international transactions.

The country has its own stock market, the Lima Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de Lima or BVL).  The BVL is a member of the Integrated Latin American Market (MILA), which includes the stock markets from Pacific Alliance countries (Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico) and seeks to integrate their stock exchanges to develop their capital markets.  In December 2017, the GOP implemented a capital markets promotion law that enables mutual funds registered in Pacific Alliance countries to trade in the Lima Stock Exchange starting in July 2018. In July 2018 the Securities Market Superintendence (SMV) published implementing regulations to enable the trade of funds in Pacific Alliance countries.

The Securities Market Superintendence is the GOP entity charged with regulating the securities and commodities markets.  Following the IMF’s recommendations, the GOP passed a law reforming the SMV’s predecessor, CONASEV (the National Commission for the Supervision of Companies, Securities, and Exchanges).  SMV’s mandate includes controlling securities market participants, maintaining a transparent and orderly market, setting accounting standards, and publishing financial information about listed companies.  SMV requires stock issuers to report events that may affect the stock, the company, or any public offerings. This requirement promotes market transparency, and aims to prevent fraud. Trading on insider information is a crime, with some reported prosecutions in past years.  SMV must vet all firms listed on the Lima Stock Exchange or the Public Registry of Securities. SMV also maintains the Public Registry of Securities and Stock Brokers. SMV is studying ways to improve the regulatory system to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment.

Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) maintained the Emerging Market status of the Lima Stock Exchange (BVL), which was under review for reclassification to Frontier status in 2017.

The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments.  Mutual funds managed USD 7.8 billion in December 2016. Private pension funds managed a total of USD 45 billion in December 2018.

Money and Banking System

Economic opening since the 1990s, coupled with competition, has led to banking sector consolidation.  Sixteen commercial banks comprise the system, with assets accounting for 89.4 percent of Peru’s financial system.  In 2018, three banks accounted for 71 percent of local loans and 69 percent of deposits among commercial banks. Of USD 128 billion in total banking assets at the end of December 2018, assets of the three largest commercial banks amounted to USD 79.99 billion.

The banking system is considered generally sound, thanks to lessons learned during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, and continues to revamp operations, increase capitalization, and reduce costs.  Non-performing bank loans rose to 2.95 percent of gross loans as of December 2018, down from a high of 11 percent in early 2001. Able bank supervision and strong GDP growth over the last decade also helped banks weather the 2008-2009 global financial crises with little trouble.

The Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP) serves as the country’s central bank.  The BCRP is an independent institution, free to manage monetary policy to maintain financial stability.  The BCRP’s primary goal is to maintain price stability, via inflation targeting. Inflation at year-end in Peru reached 6.7 percent in 2008, 0.2 percent in 2009, 2.1 percent in 2010, 4.7 percent in 2011, 2.6 percent in 2012, 2.9 percent in 2013, 3.2 percent in 2014, 4.4 percent in 2015, 3.2 percent in 2016, 1.4 percent in 2017, and 2.2 percent in 2018.  Peru’s target inflation range is 1-3 percent.

Under the PTPA, U.S. financial service suppliers have full rights to establish subsidiaries or branches for banks and insurance companies.

Peruvian law and regulations do not authorize or encourage private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association to limit or restrict foreign participation.  There are no private or public sector efforts to restrict foreign participation in industry standards-setting organizations. However, larger private firms often use “cross-shareholding” and “stable shareholder” arrangements to restrict investment by outsiders — not necessarily foreigners — in their firms.  As close families or associates generally control ownership of Peruvian corporations, hostile takeovers are practically non-existent. In the past few years, several companies from the region, China, North America, and Europe have begun actively buying local companies in power transmission, retail trade, fishmeal production, and other industries.  While foreign banks are allowed to freely establish banks in the country, they are subject to the supervision of Peru’s Superintendent of Banks and Securities (SBS).

The country has not explored or made announcements on its intention to implement or allow the implementation of blockchain technologies in banking transactions.

Peru’s financial system has 11 specialized institutions (“financieras”), 27 thriving micro-lenders and savings banks (although several large banks also lend to small enterprises), one leasing institution, two state-owned banks, and one state-owned development bank.  In 2018, the Economist Intelligence Unit again ranked Peru number two worldwide, after Colombia, on microfinance business environment because of its sophisticated legal and regulatory framework and competitive microfinance sector. The GOP established regulations to supervise savings and loan associations in January 2019.  These institutions had until the end of March to register with the SBS which will supervise savings and loan associations nationwide; 413 saving and loan cooperatives are registered with the SBS for supervision.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange Policies

There are no reported difficulties in obtaining foreign exchange.  Under Article 64 of the 1993 Constitution, the GOP guarantees the freedom to hold and dispose of foreign currency.  The GOP has eliminated all restrictions on remittances of profits, dividends, royalties, and capital, although foreign investors are advised to register their investments with ProInversion to ensure these guarantees.  Exporters and importers are not required to channel foreign exchange transactions through the Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP) and can conduct transactions freely on the open market. Anyone may open and maintain foreign currency accounts in Peruvian commercial banks.  U.S. firms have reported no problems or delays in transferring funds or remitting capital, earnings, loan repayments or lease payments since Peru’s economic reforms of the early 1990s. Under the PTPA, portfolio managers in the United States are able to provide portfolio management services to both mutual funds and pension funds in Peru, including funds that manage Peru’s privatized social security accounts.

The 1993 Constitution guarantees free convertibility of currency.  However, limited capital controls still exist as private pension fund managers (AFPs) are constrained by how much of their portfolio can be invested in foreign securities.  The maximum limit is set by law (currently 50 percent since July 2011), but the BCRP sets the operating limit AFPs can invest abroad. Over the years, the BCRP has gradually increased the operating limit.  Peru reached the 50 percent limit in September 2018.

A combination of GOP policies and market forces has led to gradual de-dollarization of the economy.  U.S. dollars account for a decreasing share of banking system transactions, according to the Bank Supervisory Authority (SBS).  In 2001, U.S. dollars accounted for 82 percent of loans and 73 percent of deposits. The amount of credit issued in USD increased 1.5 percent and deposits in 0.4 percent in 2018 compared to the previous year.  In December 2018, dollar-denominated loans reached 28 percent, and deposits 37 percent.  Funds associated with any form of investment can be freely converted into any world currency.

The foreign exchange market operates freely, for the most part.  To quell “extreme variations” of the exchange rate, the BCRP intervenes through purchases and sales in the open market without imposing controls on exchange rates or transactions.  Since 2014, the BCRP has pursued de-dollarization to reduce dollar denominated loans in the market and purchased U.S. dollars to mitigate the risk that spillover from expansionary U.S. monetary policy might result in over-valuation of the Peruvian Sol relative to the U.S. dollar.  As the U.S. economic recovery begins to tighten credit conditions and stronger terms of trade support a more stable currency, this policy may shift. Because of the free convertibility of currency, the U.S. Embassy purchases Peruvian currency for expenses on an as-needed basis at the market exchange rate.  The USD averaged PEN 3.29/USD in 2017.

Remittance Policies

There have not been any new developments related to investment remittance policies.

Peruvian law grants foreign investors the following rights: freedom to buy shares from national investors; free remittance of earnings and dividends; free capital repatriation; unrestricted access to local credits; freedom to hire technology and to pay back royalties; freedom to hire investment insurance abroad; possibility to sign juridical stability agreements for their investments in Peru with the Peruvian state.

Article 7 of the Legislative Decree N° 662 provides that foreign investors may send, in freely convertible currencies, remittances of the entirety of their capital derived from investments, including the sale of shares, stocks or rights, capital reduction or partial or total liquidation of companies, the entirety of their dividends or proven net profit derived from their investments, and any considerations for the use or enjoyment of assets that are physically located in Peru, as registered with the competent national entity, without a prior authorization from any national government department or decentralized public entities, or regional or municipal Governments, after having paid all the applicable taxes.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

Peru’s Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) manages the Fiscal Stabilization Fund.  The fund had a balance of USD 5.8 billion at the end of 2018 and consists of treasury surplus, concessional fees, and privatization proceeds, with a cap of 4 percent of GDP.  The MEF released investment guidelines for the Fiscal Stabilization Fund in December 2015. The guidelines permit investment in demand deposits, variable and fixed interest rate time deposits, and seven currencies including the USD.  The Fund is not a party to the IMF International Working Group or a signatory to the Santiago Principles. The fund serves as a buffer for the GOP’s fiscal accounts in the event of adverse economic conditions.

7. State-Owned Enterprises

Several electricity, water and sewage, bank, and oil companies remain state-owned and state-operated.  The GOP wholly owns 35 SOE’s, 34 of which are under the parastatal conglomerate FONAFE. The list of SOE’s under FONAFE can be found here: https://www.fonafe.gob.pe/empresasdelacorporacion  .

The most notable area of SOE activity pertains to the petroleum sector, where the state-owned petroleum company PetroPeru is an oil refiner and operator of an oil pipeline.  Over the last two decades, PetroPeru has experienced significant attrition in managerial and technical expertise. This, coupled with limited financial resources, cast into doubt the company’s ability to implement its long-held plans to expand and upgrade its aging Talara refinery – which continues to produce dirty gasoline and diesel fuel, a situation the government permits by not enforcing regulatory standards.  Limited resources and expertise also downplay expectations following repeated announcements from its leadership regarding entrance to upstream, and participation in a proposed gas pipeline and petrochemical complex in southern Peru. In November 2015, Peru’s Congress overrode a Presidential veto, adopting a law that allowed Peru’s oil and gas promotion agency, PeruPetro, to sign a contract directly with PetroPeru to operate Lot 192, Peru’s largest oil concession, following a failed bidding process for the claim.  Critics note the prescriptive nature of the legislation conflicts with Peru’s competition and concession laws, and that PetroPeru lacks the financial and technical resources to serve as an operator.

Peru is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization.

The GOP’s role as an enterprise owner is specified through several publically available laws and regulations.  Ownership practices are generally consistent with OECD guidelines, although not all guideline subsections are specifically addressed.  Central entity FONAFE (http://www.fonafe.gob.pe/  ) exercises ownership of SOEs with the exception of those considered intangible under the Peruvian constitution (including public university services).  FONAFE appoints an independent board of directors for each SOE using a transparent selection process. There is no notable third party analysis on SOEs’ ties to the government.

Privatization Program

The GOP initiated an extensive, but not yet complete, privatization program in 1991, in which foreign investors were encouraged to participate.  Since 2000, the GOP has promoted multi-year concessions as a means of attracting investment in major projects. In 2000, the government granted a 30-year concession to a private group (Lima Airport Partners) to operate the Lima airport.  In 2006, the government granted a 30-year concession to Dubai Ports World to build and operate a new container terminal in the Port of Callao. The terminal’s first phase became operational in May 2010. In 2006, the Swiss-Spanish-Peruvian consortium Swissport received a 25-year concession to manage nine of Peru’s northern airports.  In 2011, the GOP awarded the Argentine-Peruvian consortium Aeropuertos Andinos a 25-year concession to manage six of Peru’s southern airports. Also in 2011, the government granted a 30-year concession to a Danish-Peruvian consortium led by the Danish-based A.P. Moller-Maersk Group to operate and modernize the multipurpose northern terminal at the Port of Callao.  On June 2, 2015, the GOP awarded Spanish construction company Sacyr a 25-year concession to maintain 875 kilometers of the Andean Longitudinal Highway. The concession for Line Three of Lima’s metro, expected to be awarded in late 2016, was delayed due to corruption allegations in the Line Two project. The GOP established a single transportation authority for the city of Lima and Callao in January 2019 that will take on overall planning and issue tenders for the remaining Lima metro lines 3 and 4.  The Urban Transportation Authority (ATU) will become operational in 2019.

The concessions process is challenging for U.S. and other international companies interested in bidding on projects.  ProInversion, the government agency responsible for drawing up and completing PPP concession projects, has come under considerable criticism over the years for its bidding process, deadlines, and unrealistic timetables.  Despite the criticism, ProInversion is actively working to improve management of the PPP process.  The agency hired an international consulting firm to develop standard PPP contracting guidelines and has implemented internal reforms to streamline its processes and ensure better project management.  ProInversion re-designed its website to provide project listings in both Spanish and English and is holding outreach events to increase competition.

The GOP increased its use of government-to-government (G2G) contracting for infrastructure projects, especially as it sought to expedite and facilitate procurement and priority projects following the Odebrecht scandal.  The Organizing Committee of the Lima 2019 Pan American Games under the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MTC) contracted with the United Kingdom government in 2017 to  organize and deliver infrastructure for the Lima 2019 Pan American Games, and the MTC is pursuing a G2G contract for construction of the Chinchero Airport in Cusco.  The G2G mechanism poses limitations for U.S. government involvement and could potentially limit the ability of U.S. firms to compete.

Project opportunities are available on ProInversion’s Project Portfolio page at  ProInversion Projects: http://www.proyectosapp.pe/modulos/JER/PlantillaProyectoEstadoSector.aspx?are=1&prf=2&jer=5892&sec=30  .

8. Responsible Business Conduct

The GOP does not have a holistic action plan or national standards for responsible business conduct (RBC).  Many multinational companies already adhere to high standards for RBC. Standards for conduct on environmental, social, and governance issues are implemented through sector-specific regulation.  Supreme Decree No. 042-2003-EM promotes social responsibility in the mining sector, encouraging local employment opportunities, support to communities’ projects, development activities, and purchase of local goods and services.  The decree requires mining companies to publish an annual report on sustainable development activities. The Ministry of Energy and Mines has a guidebook for community relations, as well as public information on social measures related to the mining and energy sectors.  In February 2011, INDECOPI adopted the Peruvian Technical Regulation of Social Responsibility ISO 26000 that serves as a voluntary guide to CSR activities.  

Peru continues to implement its National Strategy to Combat Forced Labor, which emphasizes the state’s role to protect and promote labor rights.  The plan simultaneously prioritizes building capacity and empowering vulnerable groups to transform their environment and enforce their rights. The plan addresses both medium and long-term multi-sector plans to eliminate or reduce conditions that enable forced labor.  Despite these efforts, the government did not effectively enforce labor laws in all cases. Child labor (particularly in informal sectors), forced labor, and employers engaging in antiunion practices remain significant problems.

In some regions, lack of capacity hinders the government’s ability to enforce regulations.

In February 2013, the superintendent of the Lima Stock Exchange published the Code on Good Corporate Governance for Peruvian Companies, developed in conjunction with thirteen public and private entities including the Ministry of Economy and Finance.  The document outlines shareholder protections.

Several independent NGOs monitor and promote RBC, notably Peru 2021.  These organizations are able to work freely.

ProInversion serves as the National Point of Contact (NCP) for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, to which Peru is an adherent.  The NCP held a workshop to promote MNE guidelines in Arequipa in October 2017, attended by representatives from several companies, the regional government, and the Arequipa Chamber of Commerce.  ProInversion has also hosted a number of activities in 2017 to promote the OECD guidelines such as an event with the Embassy of France and the French Chamber of Commerce in April 2017 and another one to attract investment that promotes responsible enterprise conduct with the Netherlands Embassy in September 2017.

On February 15, 2012, Peru was listed as a compliant country under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), as the GOP and extractive industries openly publish all company payments and government revenues from oil, gas, and mining.  Peru is one of two EITI-compliant countries in Latin America.

10. Political and Security Environment

Although political violence against investors is rare, protests, sometimes violent, have taken place in or near communities with extractive industry operations.  Environmental and service delivery concerns were often the reason cited. Protestors often objected to the fact that environmental impact assessments were reviewed by the Ministry of Energy and Mines, rather than the Ministry of Environment.  In January 2016, the Ministry of Environment’s National Service for Environmental Assessments (SENACE) assumed responsibility for evaluating and approving environmental impact assessments and monitoring related to mining and hydrocarbons, eliminating the previous conflict of interest with the Ministry of Energy and Mines responsible for oversight.  In many cases, protestors sought public services not provided by the government. Ideological opposition to foreign mining firms, not opposition to mining itself, often leads to protests incited by NGOs. Protests related to extractives activities stopped operations of Peru’s northern oil pipeline for nearly two months in 2018 and effectively closed Peru’s second largest copper mine, Las Bambas for a month in early 2019.  According to the Ombudsman, there were 132 active social conflicts in Peru as of March 2019, of which 71 affected mining projects.

Politically motivated movements at times have opposed large extractive projects.  In some cases, these movements have been successful in delaying large investments, as occurred in the USD 4.8 billion Conga mine project in Cajamarca in August 2012.  In 2015, protestors in Arequipa delayed Mexican-owned Southern Copper’s planned USD 1.4 billion Tia Maria copper mine. In other cases, protests have stopped such investments entirely.

The Secretariat of Dialogue and Social Management  within the Vice-Ministry of Territorial Governance in the Prime Minister’s office (created January 2017) are actively engaged in mitigating social conflict connected to the extractive industry in Peru.  The offices are responsible for addressing conflict in a broader community development context, rather than only responding to social conflicts after they have already erupted. To this end, using the Social Progress Fund (created in January 2017 and implementing regulations published March 2018), the government plans to provide education, infrastructure, and health care services in areas where extractive industry projects are planned or under development.  The goal is to increase government presence and reduce potential for conflict in areas that are historically underserved and often remote.

Peru issued the Prior Consultation Law in 2011, approving implementing regulations in 2012.  The law requires the GOP to consult with indigenous communities before enacting any legislation, administrative measures, or development projects that could affect communities’ rights of territorial demarcation.  There have been several successful prior consultation processes related to the extractive industry, but the law remains controversial. Critics believe it creates burdensome processes and results in delays. The National Society of Mining, Electricity and Petroleum (SNMPE) and the government have become involved in assisting local governments to access the extractive industry “canon” (tax revenue-sharing scheme with funding for public works projects) as a way to both stimulate local development and prevent conflicts.  Although these efforts have been effective in some mining regions, in others, conflicts have continued or expanded.

Violence remains a concern in coca-growing regions.  The Shining Path narco-terrorist organization continued to conduct a limited number of attacks in its base of operations in the Valley of the Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro Rivers (VRAEM) emergency zone, which includes parts of Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica, Huanuco, and Junin regions.  In November 2016, the Department of State designated Victor Quispe Palomino, Jorge Quispe Palomino, and Tarcela Loya Vilchez as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, which imposes sanctions on foreign persons and groups determined to have committed, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.

At present, there is little government presence in the remote coca-growing zones of the VRAEM, although President Vizcarra has pledged to “pacifiy” the VRAEM by Peru’s bicentennial in 2021.  The U.S. Embassy in Lima restricts visits by official personnel to these areas because of the threat of violence by narcotics traffickers and columns of the Shining Path. Information about insecure areas and recommended personal security practices can be found at http://www.osac.gov   or http://travel.state.gov.

13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

Host Country Statistical Source USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (M USD) 2018 $225,259 2017 $211,390 www.worldbank.org/en/country
Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical Source USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
U.S. FDI in partner country (M USD, stock positions) 2017 $2,757 2017 $6,370 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal  
Host country’s FDI in the United States (M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2017 $164 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/di1fdibal  
Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP N/A N/A 2017 47.4% https://unctad.org/en/pages/diae/world%20investment%20report/country-fact-sheets.aspx  


Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

Data not available.


Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

Data not available. IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey data for 2016 is not available for Peru.

Investment Climate Statements
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