



# Integrated Country Strategy

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**Australia**

**FOR PUBLIC RELEASE**

Approved: March 21, 2022

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## 1. Chief of Mission Priorities

Together with Japan and the United Kingdom Australia is one of the United States' premier security partners. Allies for more than 70 years, our two countries have an exceptionally close diplomatic, security, and economic partnership, rooted in shared interests and democratic values. The new AUKUS trilateral security partnership offers a once-in-a-generation opportunity to deepen our strategic ties with Australia and foster greater stability, security, and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. Mission Australia will continue to intensify our trade and investment ties; our security, defense, and intelligence relationships; and our collaboration on regional and global challenges, such as PRC economic coercion and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. As we do so, we will strive to deepen and broaden public support for the U.S.-Australia Alliance to ensure our partnership remains as vital for future generations as it has been for those who stood shoulder-to-shoulder with us in every major conflict since World War I.

The U.S.-Australia economic relationship delivers robust benefits to our nations' prosperity and security, including the creation of hundreds of thousands of good-paying, high-skill jobs, including cutting-edge sectors that will propel the post-COVID-19 global economy. The United States is by far Australia's most important economic partner, with U.S. direct investment – far and away the largest in Australia – accounting for seven percent of Australia's annual GDP. Since the 2005 signing of our free trade agreement, two-way trade has more than doubled to more than \$80 billion annually. Building on these benefits, Australia is a steadfast partner in defending the global rules-based trade system, countering attempts at economic coercion from the PRC, and upholding the highest standards for critical and emerging technologies. Australia has been a global leader in combatting the COVID-19 pandemic, including donating tens of millions of vaccines, building back better from the pandemic, and preparing for future health security threats. An active partner in building resilient and secure supply chains, Australia has world-leading reserves of critical minerals essential to our national security, as well as to building the green technologies required to achieve a net zero emissions world. We will continue to advocate for greater climate ambition at all levels of government, with the private sector and academia. Our extensive collaboration in science and technology will help return us

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to the Moon, safeguard peace and stability in Antarctica, develop life-saving medicines, and ensure a safer and more secure future for both our peoples.

Our bilateral cooperation on defense and security issues is founded on the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) treaty, which marked its 70th anniversary in 2021. The new AUKUS enhanced trilateral security partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom will deepen our defense and technological ties across a range of advanced capabilities, including artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and cyber. AUKUS's first project will be to support Australia's acquisition of a nuclear-powered submarine capability. The 2021 Global Posture Review underscored Australia's important role in America's national defense strategy as a key participant in initiatives that contribute to regional stability and deter aggression. Australia is consistently ranked among the top countries for U.S.-sourced defense acquisitions. We will utilize the new opportunities in the defense realm to expand our military collaboration, manage and sustain our common systems, and ensure continued interoperability with U.S. forces. AUKUS provides an opportunity to turbocharge defense industry integration to establish truly seamless cooperation. Our law enforcement cooperation spans dozens of agencies, with concrete results tackling transnational crime syndicates and state and non-state cybercriminals, including those that prey upon vulnerable children; combatting foreign interference in our countries, as well as interference directed at our partners; fighting drugs and people smuggling; and confronting racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism.

Democracies are being challenged to demonstrate that we can deliver for our peoples, the region, and the world. Working with Australia – bilaterally with our Quad partners, Japan and India – we are committed to tangible results on issues that matter most. These include joint efforts to provide over one billion COVID-19 vaccines to the Indo-Pacific region; enhance collaboration on critical and emerging technologies; and strengthen democracies and good governance throughout the Indo-Pacific. We are collaborating with likeminded partners to preserve the rules-based international order that has underwritten the region's prosperity, even as we write the rules of the road for the emerging technologies that will dominate the global economy for decades to come, in a manner that reflects and safeguards our democratic values and combats interference from authoritarian regimes.

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Australia is a key leader in many of the multilateral organizations that underpin this rules-based order. We will work closely with Australia and other allies and partners to ensure that our values and interests are reflected and that multilateral fora and regional architecture deliver positive, practical results. Anchored in shared history and a common set of democratic values, we will engage with diverse Australian audiences to ensure that support for the Alliance remains robust. To that end, we will implement programs that foster people-to-people exchanges; expand cooperation in agriculture, education, health, science, technology, health, and the environment; and conduct outreach and focused media engagement.

## 2. Mission Strategic Framework

**Mission Goal 1:** Build the capacity of the U.S.-Australia security Alliance to address both current and future threats and challenges.

- **Mission Objective 1.1:** Enhance our bilateral security efforts and demonstrate early progress from the AUKUS enhanced security partnership, cementing Australian and international support for the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines and collaboration on a suite of advanced capabilities.
- **Mission Objective 1.2:** Expand and deepen law enforcement, intelligence, and security cooperation to achieve joint foreign, security, and intelligence priorities.
- **Mission Objective 1.3:** Increase public understanding of U.S. and Australian leadership to build a more diverse coalition supportive an enduring U.S.-Australian alliance and promote good governance and democratic values in the Indo-Pacific.
- **Mission Objective 1.4:** Provide improved consular services to U.S. citizens and U.S. government agencies to protect U.S. citizens and U.S. interests.

**Mission Goal 2:** Advance our shared prosperity, security, and values in the Indo-Pacific.

- **Mission Objective 2.1:** Support Australia's efforts to withstand PRC economic coercion, including robust foreign investment screening, to strengthen a key ally in the Indo-Pacific.
- **Mission Objective 2.2:** Encourage Australian leadership in the Indo-Pacific and in regional and multilateral fora.

**Mission Goal 3:** Increase economic growth, jobs, and productivity.

- **Mission Objective 3.1:** Leverage U.S. standing as the largest source of FDI to improve the climate for U.S. investment in emerging technologies and renewable energy.

- **Mission Objective 3.2:** Foster secure and resilient supply chains outside the commercial domination of our adversaries.

**Mission Goal 4:** Align Australia with the United States on Global Issues.

- **Mission Objective 4.1:** Convince Australia to update 2030 NDC emissions reduction targets (>40%) and fund resilience/adaptation for climate-vulnerable countries.
- **Mission Objective 4.2:** Increase Australian financial support for pandemic response recovery.

**Management Objective 1:** Ensure a safe, productive team operating in safe and secure facilities to support achieving foreign policy objectives.

**Management Objective 2:** Promote diversity, inclusion, equity, and accessibility throughout Mission Australia, which allows us to lead by the power of our example in achieving U.S. foreign policy priorities.

### 3. Mission Goals and Objectives

**Mission Goal 1** | Build the capacity of the U.S.-Australia security Alliance to address both current and future threats and challenges.

**Description** | Consistent with the interim National Security Strategy, the Mission will leverage our alliance with Australia, our closest and most like-minded partner in the region, to establish a security dynamic in the Indo-Pacific that improves our ability to engage in sustained competition while deterring conflict. Strengthening our bilateral security ties and expanding multilateral cooperation with regional partners is essential to our national security and will serve as a foundation for our broader strategy in the southwest Pacific. We will also build a foundation of public support for the Alliance among Australia's future leaders and voters to ensure its enduring strength for generations to come.

**Objective 1.1** | Enhance our bilateral security efforts and demonstrate early progress from the AUKUS enhanced security partnership, cementing Australian and international support for the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines and collaboration on a suite of advanced capabilities.

- **Objective 1.1 Justification** | The timely and successful implementation of AUKUS objectives will produce greater stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region. U.S. and UK cooperation on Australia's submarine program signals unparalleled resolve and will lead to a vital, potent military capability. The joint pursuit of advanced technological capabilities while maintaining the integrity of our research, science, and information will foster an open, accessible, and secure technology ecosystem that extends benefits beyond the trilateral partnership.
- **Objective 1.1 Linkages** | *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*; State-USAID JSP 1.4; *Indo-Pacific Strategy*; EAP-USAID JSP 1.1.



- **Objective 1.1 Risks** | Failure to demonstrate early progress would fuel the narrative that the United States is not a reliable partner for regional states to meet their security needs in the Indo-Pacific. Extensive coordination with our Australian partners, and with Australia and the UK regarding AUKUS, will mitigate this risk.

**Objective 1.2** | Expand and deepen law enforcement, intelligence, and security cooperation to achieve joint foreign, security, and intelligence priorities.

- **Justification** | Broader cooperation with Australia across all government agencies, particularly within the law enforcement communities, will support and strengthen U.S. efforts to combat illegal narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons, cybercrime, other forms of transnational crime, and terrorism.
- **Linkages** | *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*; State-USAID JSP 1.2, 1.3, 1.5. EAP-USAID JSP 3.1.
- **Risks** | Failure to expand cooperation would halt the momentum generated by recent successes and leave the United States more vulnerable to bad actors and transnational threats. Interagency collaboration within the USG and with Australian counterparts will mitigate this risk.

**Objective 1.3** | Increase public understanding of U.S. and Australian leadership and strategic objectives to build a more diverse coalition supportive of an enduring U.S.-Australian alliance and promote good governance and democratic values in the Indo-Pacific.

- **Justification** | Public opinion polls reveal that although Australian public support for the Alliance is firm, the Australian public's trust in the United States to act as a responsible global leader has fallen. These findings, coupled with demographic shifts and the rise of a younger generation that is more skeptical of the Alliance, call for the U.S. Mission to Australia to reaffirm the United States' unwavering commitment to the Alliance and demonstrate its value and relevance to diverse sectors of Australian society.
- **Linkages** | *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*; State-USAID JSP 3.1, 3.3.

- **Risks** | Failure to highlight U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific and the importance of good governance and democratic values risks creating a space for PRC interference, disinformation, and/or propaganda to spread and take hold in the region. To mitigate this risk, the Mission will ensure a broad slate of programming and engagement that reaches beyond supportive audiences and includes individuals skeptical of U.S. leadership.

**Objective 1.4** | Provide improved consular services to U.S. citizens to protect U.S. citizens and U.S. interests.

- **Justification** | Protection of U.S. citizens overseas is the top responsibility of the U.S. government overseas. We are committed to enhancing services available to U.S. citizens resident and visiting Australia.
- **Linkages** | State-USAID JSP Objective 5.1; CA FBS Goal 1.
- **Risks** | Failure to provide improved consular services would damage the Mission's ability to support U.S. citizens in Australia and improve ties with the Australian public. Post will mitigate this risk by appropriate application of resources.

**Mission Goal 2** | Advance our shared prosperity, security, and values in the Indo-Pacific.

**Description** | The Interim National Security Strategy notes that we must contend with the reality that the distribution of power across the world is changing, creating new threats. The PRC in particular has rapidly become more assertive. It is the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system. In light of this challenge, our alliance with Australia has never been stronger or more important. Australia's unflinching defense against sustained economic coercion and foreign interference can be deployed elsewhere to bolster the region's resilience against similar threats. The Mission will work with Australia to lead and sustain a stable and open international system, underwritten by strong democratic alliances, partnerships, multilateral institutions, and rules.

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**Objective 2.1** | Support Australia's efforts to withstand PRC economic and other types of coercion, including robust foreign investment screening, to strengthen key ally in the Indo-Pacific.

- **Justification** | Australia is our closest Indo-Pacific ally and a force multiplier for our U.S. strategy in the region. Our Alliance advances U.S. diplomatic, economic, and defense interests across the region and beyond. Australia is a global leader in standing up to PRC economic coercion and a steadfast supported of the rules-based international order, which Beijing seeks to undermine.
- **Linkages** | *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance; State-USAID JSP 1.4; Indo-Pacific Strategy; EAP-USAID JSP 6, 5.1.*
- **Risks** | Failing to support our most important regional ally as it faces an unprecedented PRC economic coercion campaign could undermine the alliance, send a message to our partners, allies, and adversaries that the United States cannot be relied upon, and be a missed opportunity to build a larger regional coalition to support countries that wish to stand up to Beijing's bullying. Further, it would embolden the PRC and most likely lead to new economic coercion activities in other countries. We will mitigate this risk by ensuring close coordination with Australia at all levels on efforts to push back against coercion.

**Objective 2.2** | Encourage Australian leadership in the Indo-Pacific region, and in regional and multilateral fora.

- **Justification** | Fragile economies, political instability, and extra-regional coercive economic diplomacy in the Pacific Islands and Southeast Asia present strategic, humanitarian, and economic risks. Australia's Pacific strategy and strong interest in multilateral approaches and international organizations provides a useful framework to address these issues in the region.
- **Linkages** | *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. State-USAID JSP 3.2, 3.3. Indo-Pacific Strategy; EAP-USAID JSP 1.2.*

- **Risks** | Failure to support Australian leadership risks further ceding ground to the PRC, which has already made significant inroads in expanding its influence. Post can mitigate this by ensuring close coordination with Australian government contacts on key issues.

### **Mission Goal 3 | Increase Economic Growth, Jobs, and Productivity.**

**Description** | The United States and Australia share a robust and dynamic economic relationship. Australia's diverse energy resources and strong human capital will play a critical role helping the United States defend the rules-based order, out-compete China, and deliver economic growth for the American people. While the bilateral relationship is strong, the Australian public does not demonstrate a deep understanding of the depth and breadth of our economic partnership or fully appreciate the benefits of U.S. economic engagement to Australia's economic security and prosperity.

**Objective 3.1** | Improve the climate for U.S. investment in emerging technologies and renewable energy.

- **Justification** | The United States is far and away Australia's largest source of foreign investment, which drives the economic and productivity growth that create high-paying jobs. U.S. investment and trade account for 7 percent of Australia's annual GDP, on average, equivalent to Australia's entire mining sector. Further, bilateral trade with Australia had more than doubled to USD 80 billion in the 15 years since our bilateral free trade agreement came into effect. These deep connections form a strong base to build our cooperation on 21st century economic cooperation on shared priorities including critical and emerging technologies and renewable energy sources.

- **Linkages** | *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*; State-USAID JSP 2.1, 2.3.
- **Risks** | Failure to pioneer the development of these critical and emerging technologies will undermine our shared ability to set the standards and norms for these technologies based on shared democratic values. Further, failing to lead the development of these technologies may allow Beijing or other competitors to accrue the economic benefits and gain a military advantage. Post will coordinate closely with Australian government, private sector, academic, youth, and NGO contacts on the shared interest in mitigating these risks. Further, post can work with Australia to build regional and global coalitions to support U.S. objectives on these issues.

**Objective 3.2** | Foster secure and resilient supply chains outside the commercial domination of our adversaries.

- **Justification** | Australia is an advanced economy and democratic nation that values high environmental, social, and labor standards. Both the United States and Australia are reliant on critical supply chains that run through the PRC, exposing these supply lines to the risks of forced labor, political coercion, and weak environmental practices. To decrease the exposure to these risks, both the United States and Australia have prioritized creating more secure and resilient supply chains for critical products and materials. Towards this end, Australia has some of the world's largest reserves of critical minerals vital to aerospace, defense, advanced medical supplies, as well as clean energy technology vital to combat climate change. Further, Australia's abundance of critical minerals, highly skilled labor, stable governance, and prioritization of bolstering their supply chain make it a natural partner for diversifying critical supply chains essential to national security, economic prosperity, and combatting climate change.
- **Linkages** | *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*; State-USAID JSP 1.4, 2.3.

- **Risks** | Decades of market manipulation have led to the PRC dominating numerous processes and materials for critical supply chains. Failure to develop resilient supply chains from trusted sources, such as Australia, leaves the continued economic and national security of the United States vulnerable to political interference and coercion. Post can mitigate this by encouraging and supporting Australian efforts to counter PRC economic coercion and build resilient supply chains among trusted partners.

#### **Mission Goal 4 | Align Australia with U.S. on Global Issues.**

**Description** | Consistent with the interim national security strategic guidance, the Mission will work with partners across Australia to promote U.S. and like-minded leadership globally to build cooperative efforts toward a better, safer, more resilient, and more prosperous world. At a time when the organizations, agreements, and norms underwriting the international order the United States helped establish, Australia is a steadfast and like-minded partner in defending the rules-based order, addressing global crises, and modernizing the international order and institutions for the 21st century.

**Objective 4.1** | Convince Australia to update 2030 NDC emissions reduction targets (>40%) and fund resilience/ adaptation for climate-vulnerable countries.

- **Justification** | In line with the Interim National Security Strategy and EO 14008, we must move swiftly to earn back our position of leadership and join with the international community to tackle the climate crisis. We will make the clean energy transformation a central pillar of our economic recovery efforts at home, generating both domestic prosperity and international credibility as a leader of the global climate change agenda. The world needs Australia to increase its own ambition and to join the global chorus of nations calling on the PRC to increase its climate ambition by demonstrating our own commitment. Australia is well positioned to develop and profit from the net zero economy, including in the field of renewables, hydrogen, electric battery supply chains, and critical minerals. Investing in a green economy promotes jobs in energy-intensive

industries of the future, including areas of Australian competitive advantage: green steel, modern batteries.

- **Linkages** | *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance; Indo-Pacific Strategy; EAP-USAID JSP 2.2.*
- **Risks** | The United States and the world face a profound climate crisis. We have a narrow and ever-shrinking moment to pursue action both at home and abroad in order to avoid the most catastrophic impacts of that crisis and to seize the opportunity that tackling climate change presents. Post can mitigate this by engaging with, cultivating, and supporting a broad coalition of Australian leaders across government, business, academia, and civil society who support increasing Australia's climate ambition.

**Objective 4.2** | Increase Australian financial support for pandemic response and recovery.

- **Justification** | As an advanced economy, democracy, longstanding ally, Indo Pacific leader, and member of the QUAD, Australia is an essential partner for responding to the pandemic, assisting the region's economic recovery, and augmenting regional health security.
- **Linkages** | *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance; President's Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative; State-USAID JSP 3.4.*
- **Risks** | Failure for United States and Australia to provide leadership in ending the COVID-19 pandemic, economic recovery, and preparing for the next pandemic, will leave nations across the Indo Pacific vulnerable to exploitation by our adversaries. Post can mitigate this by ensuring close coordination with Australian government contacts on the urgent need to support pandemic response efforts.

## 4. Management Objectives

**Management Objective 1** | Provide safe, secure, and adequate facilities to support Mission objectives.

- **Justification** | Mission Australia continues to grow because of the expanding alliance and shared efforts to block malign influence in the region. The resulting increase in State and other agency personnel Mission-wide requires that we improve and expand our infrastructure to meet these requirements. Our most urgent need is additional office space in Canberra that meets SECCA requirements and provides an optimum collaborative environment. The Lease Fit-Out (LFO) Project in Sydney is already nearing completion and will provide post with much needed office space to accommodate a rapidly growing USDH contingent, as well as modernize our available equipment and infrastructure, improving our collaborative working environment and allowing us to engage the community more effectively. Melbourne and Perth's current facilities suffers from several major security and safety deficiencies which can only be fully remediated through new construction. Both Melbourne and Perth also continue to increase personnel and consular-related work without adequate space.
- **Linkages** | Bureau of Overseas Building Operations (OBO) Strategic Mission; Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. State-USAID JSP 4.2.
- **Risks** | Adequate facilities and office space are necessary to host expanding personnel and resources and the growing alliance between the United States and Australia in all spheres. Without adequate office, meeting, and consular space for Canberra, Melbourne, Perth, and Sydney, essential work will not be accomplished. Post will mitigate this risk by working closely with OBO to find and utilize appropriate sites.

**Management Objective 2** | Promote diversity, inclusion, equity, and accessibility throughout Mission Australia, which will allow us to lead by the power of our example.

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- **Justification** | Advancing diversity, equity, inclusion and accessibility (DEIA) is a priority for the U.S. government. E.O. 14035 on Diversity Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility in the Federal Workforce, published in June 2021, established a U.S. government policy to cultivate a federal workforce that draws from the full diversity of the United States, and it is imperative that DEIA activities remain a priority in management and workforce practices to ensure a productive, inclusive workforce.
- **Linkages** | Preliminary DEIA Strategic Plan Secretary's Statement on Diversity and Inclusion
- **Risks** | Failure to provide support for DEIA principles risks a workforce with low morale that does not reflect an inclusive and supportive work environment. Post will mitigate this risk by utilizing best practices to ensure DEIA principles are supported throughout the mission.