



# Integrated Country Strategy

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**COLOMBIA**

**FOR PUBLIC RELEASE**

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## 1. Chief of Mission Priorities

Colombia is one of the United States' most reliable and willing partners in Latin America. Our bilateral relationship focuses on holistic counternarcotics efforts, Peace Accord implementation, a strong economic partnership, and a shared commitment to address global challenges such as climate change and migration. Fortifying Colombia's institutions and their capacity to expand state presence into rural areas, investing in counternarcotics efforts, protecting human rights, opposing external malign actors, deepening ethnic inclusion, reducing criminal impunity, including for environmental crimes, mitigating climate change, and integrating the influx of Venezuelan migrants are key to sustaining Colombia's progress. Through four Mission Goals and 10 Mission Objectives, this strategy outlines how the US will engage over the coming years in Colombia to further advance our shared priorities.

Mission Goal 1 seeks strengthened democratic institutions, more effective domestic and regional law enforcement, citizen security, reduced criminal activity, licit and sustainable economic development, and Peace Accord implementation. The 2016 Peace Accord between Colombia and the FARC was a historic achievement and remains the country's best tool for advancing a durable, inclusive end to decades of conflict. To achieve this promise, the Accord requires sustained budgetary, political and institutional support, as laid out in Mission Objective 1.1. As noted in the White House statement at the conclusion of the October 2021 High Level Dialogue, both countries are focused on a holistic approach to reducing narcotics and bolstering rural prosperity that recognizes the importance of drug supply reduction, rural security, justice, economic development, delivery of public goods and services, and environmental protection. Mission Objectives 1.2 and 1.3 advance this approach.

Mission Goal 2 emphasizes the importance of the deep bilateral economic ties between the U.S. and Colombia, as well as the job creation, inclusive growth, and expanded trade and investment that relationship makes possible. The U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA) is a foundational tool for creating a more favorable business and investment climate. That agreement, as well as a host of other programs and engagements, will enable legitimate

travel and socially and environmentally sustainable livelihoods under Mission Objectives 2.1 and 2.2.

Under Mission Goal 3, the U.S. Government will work closely with Colombian counterparts in the public and private sector to improve Colombian resiliency to efforts of external malign actors to undermine stability and gain access to Colombia. We will partner with Colombian entities and like-minded allies to enhance Colombian capacity to detect, analyze, and counter that influence.

Mission Goal 4 recognizes Colombia's status as a leader in the Western Hemisphere on many top U.S. priorities, including human rights, migration, security, climate change, and integration and protection of vulnerable communities, such as indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombian populations. Displacement and exclusion of these communities was one of the tragic consequences of Colombia's decades of conflict, and inclusion of these groups is a shared U.S.-Colombian priority in advancing peace. Colombia's generous welcome to over 1.8 million Venezuelan migrants is a bulwark against the destabilizing influence of the Maduro regime and its allies and represents an opportunity to bolster economic growth. Colombia's firm commitment to democracy and strong democratic institutions make it a leader in the region and a key partner in our efforts to promote democracy in Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and throughout the hemisphere. We support Colombian host communities to navigate the resulting challenges and realize the economic and social potential migration can create when managed well. Colombia's carbon emissions reduction targets are among the most ambitious in the world, and this strategy seeks to help Colombia follow through on these commitments while allowing Colombian communities to reap the benefits of sustainable livelihoods.

This strategy's Mission Goals are mutually reinforcing. For example, progress against illegal gold mining will reduce emissions from deforestation, advancing Goal 4, while simultaneously choking off money laundering opportunities for the illegal groups we oppose in Goal 1. The tools and relationships that will enable Colombia to be an exporter of democracy and security in Goal 3 will also allow Colombia to resist the malign actors that seek a stronger foothold in Colombia's economy. One of Mission Colombia's greatest strengths is the wide range of U.S.

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government departments and agencies. Our interlocking Mission Goals capitalize on that strength and bring true integration to the Integrated Country Strategy.

This institutional diversity of the U.S. mission in Colombia requires a farsighted management approach to staffing, facilities, and professional development for our personnel in Bogota, Barranquilla, and Cartagena. This strategy delivers on that need, with a strong emphasis on harnessing the talent and wisdom of all members of our workforce through proactive and intentional structures to deepen equity and inclusion.

This Integrated Country Strategy supports other regional and global U.S. strategies, including nearly every objective of the State Department-USAID Joint Regional Strategy for the Western Hemisphere. More expansively, the U.S.-Colombia relationship represents an opportunity to advance the pillars of President Biden's March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, from bolstering democratic allies to expanding U.S. prosperity through trade, from tackling the climate crisis to deepening our partnerships to oppose rivals, such as Russia and China. This strategy also advances the new U.S. Strategy to Counter Corruption, issued by the White House in December 2021.

Mission Colombia has a track record of rigorous review of ICS goals, objectives, and action plans. The Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) will chair regular meetings devoted to assessing progress toward each of the four Mission Goals. In addition, Mission Colombia will continue to convene reviews of the ICS annually, in order to give the Ambassador and members of the senior Country Team the opportunity to assess changes in context as well as learn from successes and failures in order to adapt future approaches.

## 2. Mission Strategic Framework

**Mission Goal 1:** Strengthened democratic institutions, domestic and regional law enforcement, citizen security, reduced criminal activity, and Peace Accord implementation through coordinated whole-of-government engagement to improve peace and security in Colombia.

- **Mission Objective 1.1:** Colombia provides sustained budgetary, political, and institutional support for commitments stipulated in the Peace Accord. (CDCS DO 1)
- **Mission Objective 1.2:** Colombian security and justice institutions improve capacities, capability, and coordination efforts to dismantle illicit armed groups, reduce narcotics trafficking and other illegal activity, and extend state presence throughout the country.
- **Mission Objective 1.3:** Strengthened inclusive democratic governance, stronger sustainable licit economies, and enhanced conflict resilience in Colombia. (CDCS DOs 2-3)

**Mission Goal 2:** Deepen bilateral economic ties and promote U.S. and Colombian prosperity and job creation through inclusive growth and expanded trade and investment.

- **Mission Objective 2.1:** Employment, trade, and investment expanded due to greater implementation of the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA) and a more favorable business and investment climate.
- **Mission Objective 2.2:** Investment, legitimate travel, and socially and environmentally sustainable economic opportunities in key sectors are increased as a result of diplomatic engagement, trade promotion, and assistance programs.

**Mission Goal 3:** Improved Colombian resiliency to efforts of external malign actors to undermine stability and gain access to Colombia.

- **Mission Objective 3.1:** Enhanced Colombian institutional capacity to detect, analyze, and counter external malign influence in Colombia's domestic systems.
- **Mission Objective 3.2:** Ensure the United States and like-minded allies remain Colombia's preferred partner on matters of national security.

**Mission Goal 4:** Colombia progresses and provides hemispheric leadership on shared global and regional priorities.

- **Mission Objective 4.1:** Colombia increases its promotion of human rights, socio-economic integration and protection of vulnerable communities, and enhances its regional leadership on migration. (CDCS SO 4)
- **Mission Objective 4.2:** Colombia expands its capacity to export security and democracy, with strong alliances and partnerships to address common threats.
- **Mission Objective 4.3:** Implementation of national climate change and environmental protection goals increases, providing the foundation for regional leadership.

**Management Objective 1:** The Mission maintains current staffing or limited growth given space constraints in current facilities, with new NSDD-38 position requests assessed against ICS priority bilateral goals and current agency presence and composition at post. ICASS staffing and support levels are adequate and maximally efficient to address both current needs and future initiatives in Bogota and Cartagena.

**Management Objective 2:** Establish realistic timelines to replace, refurbish, and expand official facilities in Bogota and Cartagena.

**Management Objective 3:** Mission management practices are transparent, advance diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility, and are compliant with all U.S. government requirements.

**Management Objective 4:** Increase professional development opportunities for all staff to build the necessary skills and institutional knowledge to ensure continuity and achievement of Mission goals and objectives.



### 3. Mission Goals and Objectives

**Mission Goal 1** | Strengthened democratic institutions, domestic and regional law enforcement, citizen security, reduced criminal activity, and Peace Accord implementation through coordinated whole-of-government engagement to improve peace and security in Colombia

**Description** | Mission Goal 1 seeks strengthened democratic institutions, domestic and regional law enforcement, citizen security, inclusive and sustainable economic development, conflict resilience, and integral Peace Accord implementation. The 2016 Peace Accord between Colombia and the FARC was a historic achievement and remains the country's best tool for advancing a durable, inclusive end to decades of conflict. To achieve this promise, the Accord requires sustained budgetary, political, and institutional support, as noted in Mission Objective 1.1. As noted in the White House and State Department statements at the conclusion of the October 2021 High Level Dialogue, both countries are focused on a holistic approach to fighting narcotics and bolstering rural prosperity that recognizes the importance of drug supply reduction, rural security, justice, economic development, and environmental protection. This includes increased cooperation to advance Colombia's implementation and enforcement of its new environmental crimes law. Mission Objectives 1.2 and 1.3 advance this approach.

**Objective 1.1** | Colombia provides sustained budgetary, political, and institutional support for commitments stipulated in the Peace Accord. (CDCS DO 1)

- **Justification** | Continued peace and prosperity in Colombia requires attention to a variety of interlocking security, economic, social, and environmental issues, identifying and overcoming the drivers of the armed conflict, repairing damage to victims--including by locating and returning to their families the remains of disappeared persons--and ending impunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The 2016 Peace Accord with the FARC provides the country's best platform for addressing these issues. It also provides an unprecedented opportunity to advance justice and reconciliation for

Colombia's 9 million conflict victims, rural reform and development, and inclusive development through implementation of the Accord's Ethnic and Gender Chapters. Mission Colombia will pursue Objective 1.1 through diplomatic advocacy and the programs and engagements of a wide variety of Departments and Agencies, with actions including law enforcement investigations, operations, and extraditions; development assistance programs; support for coca eradication; and diplomatic advocacy with local and national political actors.

- **Linkages** | JRS Objective 1.4, JRS Objective 2.2, JRS Objective 3.1
- **Risks** | The primary risk in not achieving Goal 1 is the potential for Colombia to backslide into wider violence, which would threaten the safety of Colombians, result in higher coca cultivation, and environmental damage. Increasing economic pressures, particularly amid the COVID-19 pandemic, also may reduce resources for Peace Accord implementation. Political transitions also may shift political will.

**Objective 1.2** | Colombian institutions improve capacities and coordination efforts to dismantle illicit armed groups and extend state presence throughout the country.

- **Justification** | Colombia's long-term stability depends on its ability to curtail the influence of armed criminal groups, with a particular focus on reducing the cultivation of coca, the production of cocaine, and other illicit activities that fund their operations, including environmental crimes such as illegal gold mining, illegal logging, and wildlife trafficking. These armed groups thrive in remote areas where state and security presence are lacking. USG assistance must support Colombian partners' efforts to address each of these issues, as managing them will advance Colombian stability while also reducing drug trafficking to the United States and thereby drug-related violence and overdose deaths. Colombia's Counternarcotics and Transnational Threats Command was established in February 2021 with a new elite force of 7,000 soldiers to combat criminal activity and illegal armed groups in rural areas, including environmental crimes of illegal gold mining, illegal logging, and wildlife trafficking. Colombian military operations including ZEUS and ORION as well as the establishment of Colombian Marine

reconnaissance battalions have provided additional counterparts for U.S. support in the fight against transnational crime and terrorism. Illegal gold in Colombia alone generates \$2.4 billion for criminals each year, drives deforestation, pollutes the air, degrades soil and water resources, undermines governance, and promotes corruption and human rights violations. Colombia's August 2021 environment crimes law provides an adequate framework to strengthen USG-Colombia cooperation and coordination to increase prosecutions and convictions of such crimes. Colombia's maritime zones are at risk of exploitation by state and non-state actors involved in Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing.

- **Linkages** | USG Colombia Counternarcotics Strategy (2021); Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (2021), Executive Order on Establishing the United States Council on Transnational Organized Crime (Dec. 2021); Colombia Security Sector Assistance Roadmap (May 2020); High Level Dialogue Bilateral Commitments (Oct. 2021); Executive Order 13773—Enforcing Federal Law With Respect to Transnational Criminal Organizations and Preventing International Trafficking (Feb. 2017); END Wildlife Trafficking Act (2016); Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Enforcement Act (2015).
- **Risks** | Insufficient GOC investment, capacity, coordination, and political will to expand police presence, pursue sufficient coca eradication, or implement and enforce new robust laws established to curb environmental crimes. Violence has increased as criminal groups have consolidated control in some areas in the wake of the FARC demobilization and amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

**Objective 1.3** | Strengthened inclusive democratic governance, stronger sustainable licit economies, and enhanced conflict resilience in Colombia. (CDCS DOs 2-3)

- **Justification** | Capitalizing on gains in Peace Accord implementation in Objective 1.1, the U.S. will help expand the Colombian state's presence and provide mechanisms to give citizens voice. This will increase the effective participation of citizens in state systems, increase transparency and accountability, and channel their interests to

democratic institutions rather than to illegal armed groups. This requires equitable and environmentally sustainable economic growth, which the U.S. will pursue through assistance programs under USAID and INL, as well as through sustained engagement and dialogue by the State Department's Political, Economic, and Public Affairs sections.

- **Linkages** | JRS Objective 2.2, JRS Objective 3.1, JRS Objective 3.2, JRS Objective 3.3, JRS Objective 3.5
- **Risks** | The risks of not progressing in this objective include the potential for community-level distrust of the state to increase, diminishing communities' buy-in to democracy and slowing their transition away from illicit economies. Shifting priorities following political transitions also may affect progress. A lack of attention to environmental linkages in security and economic efforts also increases the risk of Colombia seeing an acceleration, rather than a decrease, of problems such as illegal gold mining, illegal logging, and illegal cattle ranching.

## **Mission Goal 2** | Deepen bilateral economic ties and promote U.S. and Colombian prosperity and job creation through inclusive growth and expanded trade and investment

**Description** | Promoting job creation, investment, and market-oriented reforms are shared features of all three documents. Mission Goal 2 advances the priorities of promoting job creation, investment, and market-oriented reforms. The Goal will be accomplished by leveraging embassy outreach, contacts, knowledge, and assistance programs to enhance trade and investment, create U.S. jobs, and improve the economic and commercial climate in Colombia, and promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth.

**Objective 2.1** | Employment, trade, and investment expanded due to greater implementation of the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA) and a more favorable business and investment climate

- **Justification** | The CTPA does away with many trade and investment barriers, but many U.S. companies are not taking full advantage of Colombian markets due to ongoing bilateral trade irritants. Additionally, there are more opportunities for Colombian companies to invest in U.S. markets. By promoting the benefits of the agreement and the successes witnessed over the past ten years, the Embassy can help to create U.S. jobs and improve our bilateral relationship. Specific problems in Colombia's commercial legal, regulatory, and public procurement frameworks discourage investment by U.S. companies, including where Colombia itself is anxious to increase investment, such as vaccine manufacture. By advocating for solutions to these problems, promoting an entrepreneurial culture, and encouraging Colombia to screen foreign investment from a national security perspective, the embassy can provide the U.S. business community with better access to and opportunities in one of the region's most important and promising markets.
- **Linkages** | This Objective is directly tied to the Draft 2022-2026 Department of State and USAID Joint Strategic Plan, and in particular Strategic Objective 2.3: Technological Leadership and U.S. Competitiveness that aims to expand, strengthen, and reap the gains of our international partnerships and alliances. It also ties to Goal 4 of the WHA-LAC JRS Context and Strategic Framework for the ICS, to create A Prosperous Hemisphere by (Objective 4.1) fostering equitable growth through fair trade and investment.
- **Risks** | The presidential elections in 2022 cause considerable uncertainty for U.S. companies looking to invest in or trade with Colombia. A more radical presidential winner may seek to renegotiate the CPTA or begin to chip away at the economic relationship between the United States and Colombia. Moreover, an increasingly prevalent narrative that the CPTA provided more trade benefits to the United States than to Colombia may turn the tide against a growing trading relationship and lead to increasing non-tariff barriers and other obstacles to trade.

**Objective 2.2** | Investment, legitimate travel, and socially and environmentally sustainable economic opportunities in key sectors are increased as a result of diplomatic engagement, trade promotion, and assistance programs.

- **Justification** | As the United States seeks to support worldwide economic recovery following Covid-19 disruptions, U.S. government programs emphasizing investment in critical areas, such as health, connectivity, gender equity, rural development, and climate, offer opportunity for Colombia to build private-sector driven infrastructure and make investments to address their development needs. Growing the robust trading relationship will also strengthen the ties between our countries. Colombian travelers and U.S. businesses are key to our bilateral trade and investment relationship. By leveraging Embassy contacts and resources, Post can buttress both the U.S. jobs that support Colombian visitors to the United States and those U.S. jobs that are produced by U.S. businesses activities in Colombia.
- **Linkages** | This Objective is directly tied to the Draft 2022-2026 Department of State and USAID Joint Strategic Plan, both through Strategic Objective 5.2 to Facilitate Legitimate Travel, as well as Goal 2, which aims to promote global prosperity and shape an international environment in which the United States can thrive. Additionally, the objective supports Goals 2 (An Inclusive Hemisphere) and 4 (A Prosperous Hemisphere) of the WHA-LAC JRS Context and Strategic Framework for the ICS.
- **Risks** | The presidential elections in 2022 cause considerable uncertainty for U.S. companies looking to invest in or trade with Colombia. A more radical presidential winner may seek to renegotiate the CPTA or begin to chip away at the economic relationship between the United States and Colombia. Further COVID waves, or related restrictions and shutdowns, could undermine bilateral business, trade, and investment.

**Mission Goal 3 | Improved Colombian resiliency to efforts of external malign actors to undermine stability and gain access to Colombia**

**Description |** Colombia is one of our closest allies in the region and supports a rules-based international order. Malign actors present in the region, or with strong influence in the region, support the undermining of a rules-based international order and benefit from either weakened Colombian institutions or by having greater influence within Colombia.

Strengthening Colombia's ability to resist destabilizing efforts, as well as helping Colombia develop transparent laws and risk-based regulatory frameworks that incorporate national security considerations into economic transactions, will provide greater predictability and reduce the potential for corrupt influence.

**Objective 3.1 |** Enhanced Colombian institutional capacity to detect, analyze, and counter external malign influence in Colombia's domestic systems

- **Justification |** Colombia, due to its close ties to the United States and geographic proximity to Venezuela, is a target for malign actors seeking to undermine Colombia's economic, political, and security sectors. Colombia's financial and investment needs, particularly post-COVID, make it a natural target for malign actors seeking to gain influence in sensitive sectors by offering low-cost alternatives for development and infrastructure projects. While the United States plays an important role in informing Colombia of these risks, Colombia needs to develop its own capacity to screen for national security threats in a broader range of economic sectors. Increasing Colombia's ability to detect, analyze, and counter malign influence will contribute to the strength of the U.S.-Colombia relationship. Helping Colombia develop the capacity to respond to cyberattacks will also benefit the United States and Colombia in the long run. U.S. support will increase Colombia's ability to detect and counter disinformation campaigns seeking to destabilize Colombia or to shape political narratives harmful to our shared values.

- **Linkages** | WHA/LAC Joint Regional Strategy Objectives 1.3, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 3.2; Joint Strategic Plan Objective 1.4; Colombia Security Sector Assistance Roadmap (May 2020).
- **Risks** | Colombia could refuse U.S. support if such support would cause political confrontation with certain malign actors on the world stage. High-level political engagement and widespread adoption by like-minded countries of these institutional capacities could mitigate the possibility of Colombia feeling exposed for enhancing its capacities in this space.

**Objective 3.2** | Ensure the United States and like-minded allies remain Colombia's partner of choice on matters of national security

- **Justification** | More than twenty years of sustained programmatic assistance has established the United States as the partner of choice on matters of national security. U.S. military training for Colombian military and police has fostered innumerable working relationships that have led to strong bilateral cooperation on security matters. Additionally, Colombia is NATO's only "Global Partner" in South America. Increasing Colombia's interoperability with NATO forces and fostering greater political integration between Colombia and NATO will help inhibit malign actor overtures in the security space and provide NATO a location from which it can engage potential future "Global Partners" in the region.
- **Linkages** | WHA/LAC Joint Regional Strategy Objectives 1.3 and 3.2; Joint Strategic Plan Objective 1.4; Colombia Security Sector Assistance Roadmap (May 2020).
- **Risks** | Increasingly onerous processes to vet military and police students seeking to train in the United States opens the door to more flexible training programs in other countries. Malign actors may offer training opportunities or heavily subsidized equipment in an effort to develop institutional relationships that would threaten a U.S. foothold in Colombia. Reducing U.S. bureaucratic hurdles to such training would increase the likelihood that the United States maintains its position as partner of choice on matters of national security.



## **Mission Goal 4 | Colombia progresses and provides hemispheric leadership on shared global and regional priorities**

**Description |** The Colombian government is our closest partner in the hemisphere, with strong institutions, shared democratic values, and a focus on integrating vulnerable communities to achieve a lasting peace. This framework positions Colombia to provide increased leadership and support for U.S. regional goals to promote human rights, export security and democracy, and improve environmental protection. Embassy Bogota has designed its policy outreach and programmatic approach to strengthen Colombia's ability to influence regional dynamics and democratic outcomes. This entails supporting Colombia in its efforts to address rooted inequalities that undermine stability and challenge Colombia's advancement toward a long-term peace. Afro-Colombians, Indigenous peoples, women, and rural communities suffered harm and violence disproportionately during Colombia's armed conflict and continue to suffer disproportionate rates of violence, especially as armed groups battle for territorial control. Young people, between the ages of 10 and 29, still face disproportionate risk to forced recruitment by illegal armed actors, suffer from high levels of unemployment, and lack opportunities for economic and social integration, all of which were exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, especially for migrants, former youth offenders, victims of gender-based violence, and former child soldiers. Today, LGBTQI+ communities also face high rates of violence in both rural and urban areas of Colombia. Colombia has already proved a willing partner and leader on humane migration policies, including by implementing Temporary Protected Status for Venezuelans. We can capitalize on this momentum and leadership to not only advance our regional migration goals, but showcase Colombia's forward-leaning approach on human rights. Improving protections for these vulnerable communities will build a more stable and just country, strengthening Colombia's ability to serve as a regional leader advancing shared priorities. In addition, Colombia is a willing partner to combat climate change and has broad political support to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Our technical and diplomatic support will help ensure Colombia achieves its ambitious climate objectives which underlie Colombia's economic resilience and long-term sustainable growth. Deforestation is the main

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source of Colombia's emissions and the most critical focus for U.S. climate cooperation. Building on existing efforts to develop Colombia's renewable energy market, increase participation in the carbon tax and offset market, and expand Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) projects in strategic areas will all support Colombia in achieving its goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

**Objective 4.1** | Colombia increases its promotion of human rights, socio-economic integration and protection of vulnerable communities, and enhances its regional leadership on migration (CDCS SO 4)

- **Justification** | Colombia's vulnerable communities, including Afro-Colombian, Indigenous, women, youth, and rural populations, suffered disproportionately during Colombia's 50-year armed conflict. The 2016 Peace Accord provided a roadmap for improving protections and integration of vulnerable communities, though continued narco-trafficking-related armed group violence threatens progress. USG support for Colombia's prioritization of vulnerable communities is critical for addressing rooted social inequalities that perpetuate instability and for demonstrating to the region that protecting vulnerable communities creates stronger, more prosperous countries. Embassy Bogota focuses on promoting human rights through technical assistance, training, and public messaging. Colombia has borne the brunt of the effects of the Venezuela crisis, receiving over 1.8 million migrants and more than 500,000 Colombian returnees seeking food, healthcare, education for their children, and a better life. More than 80 percent of Venezuelan migrants have indicated their intention to stay in Colombia for the medium to long-term, regardless of what happens in Venezuela. In February 2021, Colombia made the historic decision to grant Temporary Protective Status, offering a legal pathway for migrants to stay. Embassy Bogota provides humanitarian assistance to address immediate gaps in service provision and protection, and longer-term development assistance to help migrants integrate into Colombian systems and economy.

- **Linkages** | CDCS SO 4, JSP Goals 1 and 3; JRS Goals 3-4; National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality; Executive Order 13985
- **Risks** | The presidential election in 2022 and potential shift to a more left-leaning government may – at least initially – disrupt longstanding government-to-government partnerships. In addition, public confidence in Colombian institutions, including regulatory and investigatory bodies, political parties, and Congress, is under stress. Populism, recent corruption scandals, urban-rural and economic (rich-poor) divides, deeply rooted social and economic inequalities, plus underrepresentation of Indigenous and Afro-Colombians in government institutions contribute to this decline of trust. The continued deterioration of conditions in Venezuela will perpetuate the burden on Colombia’s resources to absorb and care for a growing Venezuelan migrant population.

**Objective 4.2** | Colombia expands its capacity to export security and democracy, with strong alliances and partnerships to address common threats.

- **Justification** | Embassy Bogota’s support for Colombia’s democratic institutions, capable security forces, and leadership in multilateral fora will enhance regional stability and the USG capacity to influence democratic outcomes region-wide. In addition, Colombia’s active participation and leadership in multilateral fora, including the United Nations, the Organization of American States provides a platform for Colombia to lead the region in support of U.S. priorities. Colombia’s security forces are the most capable and advanced in the region, positioning Colombia to export security priorities, shape common tactics, and facilitate interoperability among partner nations. With USG support, Colombian security institutions can institutionalize security cooperation as a tenet of their security doctrine, expanding the reach of our security priorities. On global health priorities, including the battle against COVID-19, our strong bilateral relationship and partnership with Colombian institutions can improve efforts to respond to the pandemic. Colombia’s leadership against this global threat can improve domestic health inequalities that undermine regional stability. As international bodies like the Inter-American Court on Human Rights issue rulings, especially those related to violations

occurring during the armed conflict, Colombia has the opportunity to serve as the model for the region by demonstrating full compliance.

- **Linkages** | U.S.-Colombia Action Plan (USCAP); JSP Goals 1 and 3; JRS Goals 3 and 4.
- **Risks** | Continued narco-trafficking and armed group violence challenges Colombia's security goals in the rural territories. The instability in neighboring Venezuela and continued migration flow, along with violence along the Colombia-Venezuela border, stretch Colombia's security resources. Domestic unrest related to rooted and systemic social inequalities can distract Colombia's security forces from other priorities, as occurred during the 2021 national protests. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated existing inequalities and contributed to the unrest, driving up the rates of poverty, hunger, and unemployment. The United Nations has one of its largest worldwide footprints in Colombia and there has, at times, been an antagonistic relationship between some UN bodies in-country and their host government/member-state.

**Objective 4.3** | Implementation of national climate change and environmental protection goals increases, providing the foundation for regional leadership.

- **Justification** | Post can support the U.S. Government's goal of driving global climate ambition by capitalizing on Colombia's ambitious Nationally Determined Contribution of 51 percent reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, its New York Declaration on Forests goal of reaching net-zero deforestation by 2030, 2021 signing of the Global Methane Pledge, and long-term objectives of increased resilience and net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 as outlined in its E2050 strategy. Colombia's progress towards these ambitious goals will help drive ambition and low-emissions development among other countries in the region, particularly those within the Amazon Basin. It also responds to the Biden administration's objective of translating climate ambition into effective Paris Agreement implementation. As the drivers of deforestation have links to criminality and narco-trafficking, this objective also reinforces Post's objectives under Goal 1.

- **Linkages** | Executive order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad (January 27, 2021), Secretary Blinken's Policy Guidance on Exercising U.S. Leadership to Tackle the Climate Crisis (21 State 97546), White House Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (2021), USAID [Draft] Climate Change Strategy (2021).
- **Risks** | While Post expects continued GOC political support for climate change goals, the post-Duque administration may not allocate the same level of attention to climate. Colombia will struggle to meet its NDC goals without sufficient political will and a clear, enforceable implementation strategy – particularly on addressing deforestation.

## 4. Management Objectives

**Management Objective 1** | The Mission has maintained current staffing or limited growth given space constraints in current facilities, with new position requests assessed against ICS priority goals, current agency presence and composition at post, and ICASS resources.

- **Justification** | After years of staff growth, Mission facilities in Bogota and Cartagena are at maximum capacity. In some cases, offices lack the desk space to accommodate current staffing numbers. While agencies continue to express interest in establishing both bilateral and regional presences and/or increasing existing staff, space limitations require that all requests be weighed carefully against the highest ICS priorities. Agencies with a compelling need to be present in Colombia, or to expand their presence in outyears, will be included in master planning exercises for future facilities (see Management Objective 2). The management section needs to also maintain pace with ICASS hiring and training to maintain quality services. Professional development is a priority focus after almost two years of loss in training opportunities related to COVID-19 disruptions.
- **Linkages** | Ensuring the appropriate agency staffing and composition, in line with National Security Decision Directive 38 (NSDD-38) and available resources, underpins the accomplishment of all other ICS goals. Longer-range staffing growth requirements will be linked with planning for future facilities in Colombia and Mission Colombia's Overseas Presence Review from October 2019. Management Objective 1.1 links directly to the Cross-Cutting Management Objective of the WHA-LAC Joint Regional Strategy to build a diverse, inclusive, and dynamic workforce.
- **Risks** | Failure to contain growth will strain resources, create fire and safety problems through overcrowding of space beyond planned capacity, and increase demands on existing staff with impact to service levels. The result would be significant unexpected costs and/or employees working in unprotected offices or functional spaces

without appropriate security waivers, exceptions, or approved mitigation, and deterioration in service quality to the full Mission customer base.

**Management Objective 2 | Concrete plans and realistic timelines established to replace, refurbish, and expand official facilities in Bogota and Cartagena.**

- **Justification |** Embassy Bogota and Embassy Branch Office (EBO) Cartagena are on OBO's Top 80 list for new or upgraded office facilities. The Chief of Mission Residence (CMR) is slated for a 2023 major rehabilitation project. Deficiencies across facilities encompass areas of health, security, and safety, and the need for additional office space. In late 2021, Mission Colombia and OBO began developing a Master Plan expected to be completed within FY2022. In addition, Post and OBO restarted pre-award activities, delayed by COVID-19, for a major upgrade project to Cartagena's EBO, and initiated activities to find a replacement EBO in the future. Post warehousing will need to be addressed through this next ICS cycle, as due to rezoning plans in Bogota, the Embassy will lose its main off-site warehouse in the next 2-3 years and must secure a replacement.
- **Linkages:** Insufficient, inadequate, and unsafe space impact all other ICS goals by affecting their core office operations and limiting ability to accept new agencies/or growth as well as requiring additional support resources from the ICASS platform to deal with aging buildings and failing systems. Facility needs and safety/security deficiencies have been also documented in the OIG's Report from their 2018 inspection of Mission Colombia, as well as in OBO's 2009 Master Plan and 2016 Alternative Analysis. Lastly, this objective aims to equip our workforce a modern and secure infrastructure per the Cross-Cutting Management Objective in the WHA Joint Regional Strategy.
- **Risks |** Failure to make progress on these needs in a timely manner threatens operational viability, the safety and security of personnel, and could result in significant expenditures as these facilities continue to deteriorate. Programmatic

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objectives could be negatively impacted if we do not create space to accommodate new and expanding offices.

**Management Objective 3** | Mission management practices are transparent, advance diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility, and are compliant with all U.S. government requirements.

- **Justification** | With the re-entry of the full workplace after two years of disruption due to COVID-19, policies and support operations need to be reviewed and adjusted in light of new work realities and new opportunities. This focus includes not only institutionalizing mandatory operational changes and new innovations resulting from the COVID-19 experience, but also incorporating D&I principals within both policies and implementation. Some of the most pivotal operational changes with re-entry will center around maintaining new health and building safety standards and assisting Mission managers with administering new situational telework policies for LE staff and for USDH, allowing greater flexibility for work from both primary and alternate worksites.
- **Linkages:** The operational platform of the Mission underpins the work of all ICS goals. Under this objective, however, there will be a special focus on ensuring that the Mission's practices further the goals outlined in Executive Order 14035 on Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility (DEIA) in the Federal Workforce. Policies will also be reviewed in light of the Covid-19 Mitigation Process (CMP) guidance introduced in late 2021.
- **Risks** | Failure to adjust operations and policies to the new realities of a post-COVID-19 workplace will result in inefficiencies, potential risks to employees, and potential risk to the USG if not carefully rolled out to be in line with both USG and host government laws and regulations. Practices that fail to account for DEIA priorities can lead to unequal treatment between employees and represent a missed opportunity to recognize and benefit from a diversity of ideas and beliefs.