



Integrated Country Strategy

BURKINA FASO

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1. Chief of Mission Priorities

Burkina Faso's January 24, 2022 coup d'état has compelled us to recalibrate our relationship with this country, which remains critical to U.S. efforts to counter the spread of extremism in the Sahel and to the littoral countries to the south. Before the coup, Burkina was considered a consolidating democracy. Post-coup our emphasis needs to be on rebuilding and strengthening democratic norms and institutions, advocating for the protection of human rights and civil liberties, while at the same time continuing humanitarian and development assistance, and when possible, security assistance to prevent further terrorism and deterioration of the economy. This document will now guide our engagement with Burkina Faso during the critical transition period back to full democracy, currently set to be three years. The transition government has declared it will use this period (a) to restore security and regain territory lost over the last six years; (b) to allow the return home of nearly two million internally displaced people (IDPs) and address a humanitarian crisis unprecedented in the country's history; (c) to reform the political system and erase the remaining vestiges of the 27 yearlong Compaore regime; (d) instill durable democratic norms and values within the Burkinabe people; and (e) to heal divisions and strengthen social cohesion.

These goals largely align with our own for Burkina, but much is still uncertain as the new transition government has yet to demonstrate the ability to meet their established goals or prove to the international community that it will uphold the norms that are a prerequisite for much of our assistance. We are adjusting our engagement in light of these new circumstances. The Millenium Challenge Corporation's March 31 decision to suspend Burkina's second compact and eligibility for a regional one will have ripple effects across most ministries. Burkina Faso is barred from substantial security assistance as a result of coup-related restrictions. Should its ranking on trafficking in persons fall to Tier 3 in the next year or two, assistance could be affected. Backsliding in other areas could cost the transitional authorities additional assistance should we readjust our willingness to exercise notwithstanding authority.

What we do know is that the challenges Burkina Faso faces have not gotten any easier. Since we wrote our last ICS, the security situation has worsened substantially. Extremists now

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control large portions of the country and the government is able to project power in limited parts of the country. The humanitarian situation is worsening. IDP numbers have grown from 47,000 in 2018 to approximately two million in April 2022. Climate change and population growth, coupled with covid shocks to the economy, are making the economic future for young Burkinabe look increasingly grim.

Burkina has been incredibly unlucky in recent years. The first terrorist attacks in Ouagadougou took place just days after President Kabore took office in 2016 and have continued elsewhere in the country ever since. Covid restrictions and their resulting disruptions hurt the economy. Burkina is reliant on Ukraine and Russia for grain imports and the war in Ukraine is driving up food, fertilizer, fuel, and animal feed prices here, at a time when inflation was already increasing due to reduced domestic production caused by low rainfall and insecurity preventing farmers from accessing their land. Burkina Faso, already one of the poorest countries in the world, is not equipped to weather these storms.

This is a country that still stands to benefit enormously from partnership with the U.S. That is not a one-sided partnership, either. The United States is held in high regard by the population; there is an underlying basis for a return to the democratic fold. There is potential for American investors in agriculture and mining, among other sectors. There are strategic links to allies in the greater Sahel and West Africa. Our national security interest to disrupt and degrade the capacity of internationally linked extremist groups aligns with the Burkinabe's goal of keeping the extremism now consuming them from spreading further.

In the sections below, we will outline how we intend to do this within the constraints we now find ourselves working post-coup:

Democratization, Human Rights

Before the coup, Burkina was a consolidating democracy with a recent track record of solid elections. We saw our role as helping to solidify those democratic gains and increase our security focus. However, until and unless the country can get a credible democratically elected government in place, we will not be able to return to our previous assistance levels on security and development to include MCC. Therefore, in the next three years, our top priority will be to

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push Burkina Faso back towards a credible democracy in as short a time as possible. Credible elections are the end-goal, since only then can 7008 restrictions be lifted and our previous assistance resume. We have provided support to elections in the past and will continue to do so.

But democracy is more than elections, and the weeks since the coup have made clear that a large portion of the Burkinabe no longer trust their democratic institutions. Those must be rebuilt or strengthened, and the people must believe in them. The coup made clear that many of Burkina's democratic institutions were set atop a foundation that did not fully embrace them. In order for democracy to succeed long term, those institutions need to be more robust and need to be responsive to the citizenry and perceived as such. We will seek out the surviving green shoots that survived the coup and nurture them.

We will also support Burkina's efforts to build social cohesion, reconcile grievances, and create a lasting inclusive national identity. Much of these efforts will need to focus on marginalized populations, including the ethnic minorities who find themselves torn between impossible situations: recruited by extremists who share their identity but threaten their very lives; distrusted by their neighbors and their host communities and thought to be members of the same groups that victimize them. Women, youth and IDPs are other key cohorts in state and electoral reform.

Central to our efforts is the notion of justice, which goes straight to the goal of creating a credible state with institutions that the Burkinabe feel are representative, responsive, and address their needs. Past indiscretions by the government must be addressed, but the justice system in general needs to become a quicker and more accountable institution. One thousand people sit in the high security prison awaiting trial. Kidnappings and disappearances are common outside major cities, where people feel both government and terrorists commit misdeeds with impunity. For the country's democracy to take root, this must change.

Security

The transition government states that security and control of territory lost to extremists is their most urgent concern. If the government cannot reverse the losses of the past six years, the Burkina Faso of the near future will not resemble the country as it was founded.

The security situation has dramatically worsened since we last wrote an ICS. While it is hard to know for certain, we believe the authorities have full control over less than the 70% of the country that they claim. Extremist groups have grown in audacity, strength, and capabilities; tactics have changed and become more sophisticated – including advanced IEDs, etc. Attacks killing ten or more civilians are a weekly occurrence – during some periods, daily.

The lack of security affects every element of our work. It dissuades increased private sector investment. It is causing millions of displacements, which affects the humanitarian situation. A lack of government control makes it difficult to carry out sustainable development and other efforts that depend on at least a minimal amount of government capacity. And the government's need to focus on security makes it tough to get them to focus on other pressing concerns. These first two goals are mutually reinforcing. In order to run credible elections, the government will need to be able to project power into places they currently cannot, meaning they will need to have a base level of security.

The worsening security situation has renewed our focus on protecting the lives of American citizens. The government's ability to project power and control the situation is limited in much of the country, making their response to attacks uncertain. We are unable to access the majority of the country. Extremists increasingly target communications and road networks that make it that much harder to contact our citizens and provide assistance if need be.

Given this urgency, we will engage where we can under Section 7008 restrictions. However, we will need to be strategic, and identify areas where we are allowed to engage, where doing so fits within our national security interests, and where it is justifiable given the government's progress towards a democratic transition. At this moment, we intend to lean forward until and unless the transition government's actions force us to reassess.

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However, in order to do this, we will need to see progress on human rights. Investigations of abuses by security forces long pending must move forward. New allegations must be promptly investigated. The transition government must remain transparent with the international community. Trials of those accused of terrorism must be resumed. The transition government's wavering on this front will make it difficult for us to justify our continued cooperation beyond the bare minimum to safeguard American citizens.

Economic Growth

Promoting equitable economic growth, sustainable development efforts, and delivering humanitarian assistance represent the foundation upon which our other engagement efforts with Burkina Faso rest. Without improvement across all of these areas, Burkina Faso will not be able to offer a future to its vibrant, rapidly growing population, even if it succeeds in turning the tide against violent extremists. Despite years of steady improvement, Burkina Faso remains one of the poorest countries in the world, a fact that was not improved by the blow to the economy dealt by the global COVID-19 pandemic and now the impact of the war in Ukraine. Largely spared from 7008-related restrictions, our engagement in these areas will be able to continue.

One immediate casualty of the January 2022 coup d'état was Burkina Faso's second Millennium Challenge Corporation compact, which the MCC Board suspended on March 31, 2022. Unless the transition government drastically shortens its three-year transition timetable and holds credible elections in the short term – and assuming the MCC Board of Directors continues to allow the compact to live on in suspended form – Burkina Faso will not be able to take advantage of the myriad benefits the MCC affords during the three years covered by this ICS. U.S. and other investors drawn to Burkina by its inclusion in the prestigious program may well look elsewhere. Economic growth gains from the Compact, which was to provide major improvements to the vital electricity sector, will not come to pass. Nor will a proposed regional MCC compact involving Burkina and Cote d'Ivoire.

Nonetheless, we will continue to work with U.S. companies currently in Burkina Faso and those interested in accessing its underutilized trade potential to increase what is currently a relatively small amount of bilateral trade and investment.

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A complex crisis has taken hold in Burkina Faso, driven by rising insecurity, and exacerbated by a lack of government presence and effectiveness, a climate crisis, a food and nutrition crisis, and a water security crisis. This has resulted in an estimated two million IDPs, and over 3.5 million people in need of immediate humanitarian assistance. Many, especially women and children, are struggling to meet their basic needs, having to modify their income generating activities against a backdrop of insecurity, increased competition for resources and sanitary hazards including COVID-19 and avian flu. To address this multifaceted crisis, USAID is implementing humanitarian assistance and development activities in democracy, human rights, and governance; health; agriculture, food security, and economic growth; and education. Part of this approach includes a multi-sector resilience program that comprehensively addresses the root causes of poverty and the recurrent shocks and stresses to which vulnerable communities are exposed.

The availability and quality of health care, particularly in rural areas, is limited and affected by persistent insecurity. Communicable diseases remain the primary cause of outpatient consultations in public health facilities. Malaria is the largest contributor overall as well as the primary cause of morbidity and mortality for children under five. Early 2020 data trends show a decrease in the incidence of malaria both in the general population and in children under 5 years of age. As a Presidential Malaria Initiative (PMI) focus country with increased malaria funding and technical resources, Burkina Faso is well poised to see a further reduction in malaria infection and death. Burkina Faso is characterized by the persistent prevalence of malnutrition and has also been named a USG Nutrition Priority Country. Maternal and child mortality rates have decreased respectively in Burkina Faso from 341 to 330 per 100,000 live births and from 129 to 81.6 per 1,000 live births between 2010 and 2015. However, challenges remain as the rates of maternal and child mortality remain unacceptably high. Additionally, the total fertility rate was estimated at 5.4 births per woman (Malaria Indicator Cluster Survey, 2018) despite an increase in modern contraceptive prevalence rate. In 2018, the adult HIV prevalence rate was estimated at less than one percent for adults 15 to 49 years of age. Like other countries, Burkina Faso has also confronted the COVID-19 global pandemic. With the inclusion of CDC and the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), the Mission's overall health-

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related outreach has expanded dramatically in recent years, and this document reflects the many initiatives planned.

English fluency is exceptionally rare in Burkina Faso with a rough estimate of 10,000 people out of 21 million able to speak with professional fluency. Expanding English proficiency throughout the country would lead to greater job opportunities for young professionals and open business and development opportunities. Thus, our English language programs are prominently featured in this document.

Diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility are core values for achieving each and every goal. The Mission makes a conscious effort to develop programs that target women, youth, and marginalized communities, IDPs, and the disabled. We will continue to increase the participation of these groups in Mission programs and highlight their journey and achievements.

Finally, especially in light of the coup affecting donors' legal ability and willingness to keep providing assistance, strengthening donor coordination must be a focus. We must look for ways to deconflict and put our investments where we have a strategic advantage or unique capacities and where we can force multiply.

The January 2022 coup d'état has not changed the many challenges Burkina Faso faces. Nor has it changed our strategic national interest in helping the country fight extremism so that it cannot spread and pose a threat to U.S. citizens and interests elsewhere in West Africa and around the world. We face a challenging few years, severely limited in our engagement with the government of Burkina Faso by the decision of just a few Burkinabe to overthrow their democratically elected government. The government they deposed was not perfect, but it was a willing and increasingly capable partner in the fight against terrorism, an encouraging pillar of democracy in an increasingly challenging neighborhood. We hope that Burkina Faso can one day, perhaps in the next three years, recover from this large step backwards and begin again as a stronger, more durable democracy. Embassy Ouagadougou is committed to engaging with the people of Burkina Faso and doing all we can to assist in what no doubt will be a difficult road ahead.

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2. Mission Strategic Framework

Mission Goal 1: Promote Return to Democracy and Improved Governance

- **Mission Objective 1.1:** Collaborate with the transition government and other stakeholders to promote a speedy return to democratically elected rule.
- **Mission Objective 1.2:** Strengthen Burkinabe institutions that provide justice and the rule of law, defend human rights, promote transparency, and fight corruption in order to improve governance and service delivery, particularly in rural areas and where state presence has diminished.
- **Mission Objective 1.3:** Outreach and development programs support Burkina Faso's already vibrant civil society and lead to enhanced communication and transparency by the government, which improves the country's efforts to build social cohesion and counter violent extremism.

Mission Goal 2: Improve Peace and Security

- **Mission Objective 2.1:** Within coup-related restrictions, build Burkinabe security forces' and law enforcement institutions' capacity to counter terrorism and maintain public order while respecting human rights and the rule of law.
- **Mission Objective 2.2:** Strengthen the Burkinabe government's ability to effectively communicate its strategic goals and accomplishments in order to improve civil-military relations and foster broader social cohesion.
- **Mission Objective 2.3:** Enhance Mission capabilities to protect and support the safety and security of U.S. citizens.

Mission Goal 3: Promote Development, Trade, and Economic Growth

- **Mission Objective 3.1:** Foster economic opportunity, particularly for often marginalized populations, through increased U.S. trade and investment to increase economic wellbeing and reducing the primary driver of VEO and Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO) recruitment.
- **Mission Objective 3.2:** Assistance and development programs improve the health of the people of Burkina Faso.
- **Mission Objective 3.3:** Support government efforts to strengthen resilience to climate change, fight illicit trade, eliminate trafficking in persons and goods, and improve its capacity to collect taxes and other fees in order to promote sustainable economic growth.

Management Objective 1: Recruit and train a talented, capable, and diverse workforce of both American and Locally Employed Staff to support Mission goals and objectives.

Management Objective 2: Obtain the necessary resources and continue staff recruitment to effectively manage transition and growth, thereby providing a robust platform to support the Embassy's growing footprint.

3. Mission Goals and Objectives

Mission Goal 1: Promote Return to Democracy and Improved Governance

Description: Support the repair and rebuilding of democratic institutions that will allow for credible elections, signaling the end of Burkina Faso's transition government and permitting the resumption of U.S. assistance suspended by the January 2022 coup d'état.

Objective 1.1: Collaborate with the transition government and other stakeholders to promote a speedy return to democratically elected rule.

- **Justification:** The January 24, 2022 coup d'état forced the U.S. to end many much-needed assistance programs, particularly in the security sector, and prompted the suspension of its second compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Until the country holds credible, democratic elections, it will remain ineligible to receive certain forms of assistance; should the transition government show signs of democratic backsliding or a failure to uphold international norms in such areas as human rights, we may choose to scale back our exercise of notwithstanding authority to continue programs not expressly forbidden post-coup. Thus a speedy return to democratic rule is the foundation upon which much of our cooperation with Burkina Faso rests during the time period covered by this document. It must remain our top priority in the near future.
- **Linkages:** This objective supports the State/USAID AF Joint Regional Strategy's Goal 3: Strengthen Democracy, Human Rights, and Good Governance.
- **Risks:** Burkina Faso's failure to hold democratic elections in the short term would prolong the country's ineligibility for certain types of security assistance, negatively impacting their fight against terrorism and permitting the spread of violent extremism to other West African states. Our robust slate of assistance and engagement programs aim to reinforce the importance of democratic norms, the capacity of democratic institutions, and the understanding among key members of the transition government of the downsides of a prolonged transition.

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Objective 1.2: Strengthen Burkinabe institutions that provide justice and the rule of law, defend human rights, promote transparency, and fight corruption in order to improve governance and service delivery, particularly in rural areas and where state presence has diminished.

- **Justification:** Despite hopeful signs during the 2015-2022 period, democracy, human rights, and governance in Burkina Faso are undermined by the weak political institutions, governance structures, and lack of democratic norms resulting from the country's post-colonial history, dominated by coups d'état and military regimes, including the 27-year rule of Blaise Compaore. As a result, political representation via free elections is not an established norm, undermining accountability. Corruption remains pervasive, rendering national and decentralized institutions ineffective in the delivery of public services. The lack of an effective judiciary fuels a sense among the population that the powerful act with impunity. Coupled with a frustrating counterterrorism fight that has led citizens to further doubt their government, these structural challenges leave Burkina Faso at high risk for continued instability, incivility, and vulnerability to violent extremism. Despite constitutional protections, a number of abuses have affected the status of women; youth; rural and ethnic minority populations; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) people; religious groups; and the poor in general. Key actors like the media and civil society organizations lack the capacity to raise awareness of these issues and hold both state and non-state actors accountable for violations of international norms and local law. The past several years, during which government spending shifted to support a growing military effort, the global pandemic cut into economic growth, and increasing instability has increased humanitarian needs, have left the transition government with meager resources to cope with burgeoning demands. Even in the face of increasing impatience from rural populations (regarding security, justice, and public services), and urban needs (jobs and improved educational opportunities for youth in particular), Burkina Faso has been slow to confront its mounting challenges.
- **Linkages:** This objective supports the State/USAID AF Joint Regional Strategy's Goal 3: Strengthen Democracy, Human Rights, and Good Governance.

- **Risks:** Failing to strengthen these institutions could perpetuate grievances among the Burkinabe people and drive further social instability or extremist recruitment. Our engagements with the transition government will underscore the importance of progress in this area.

Objective 1.3: Outreach and development programs support Burkina Faso's already vibrant civil society and lead to enhanced communication and transparency by the government, which improves the country's efforts to build social cohesion and counter violent extremism.

- **Justification:** Burkina Faso's politically active civil society organizations consist of a loose conglomeration of trade unions, student and other youth organizations, women's groups, human rights NGOs, and other organizations representing (mostly) urban interests. Although there are reportedly some 70,000 registered, most are single-person or single-issue organizations that are hardly active (or even completely defunct). The media, while largely free, practice self-censorship and have been hampered in their ability to provide timely information to the public on the security situation by legal restrictions on content that may negatively impact the fight against terrorism. U.S. government efforts to enhance the capacity of civil society have largely focused on youth, but other marginalized groups, such as ethnic minorities, the LGBTI community, and women stand to play a larger role in civil society than is already the case. Exchange programs and Public Affairs outreach have a role to play in professionalizing and increasing the ability of civil society to have a positive impact on social cohesion and efforts to counter radicalization among the population.
- **Linkages:** This objective supports the State/USAID AF Joint Regional Strategy's Goal 3: Strengthen Democracy, Human Rights, and Good Governance.
- **Risks:** The vibrancy of Burkina Faso's civil society has throughout its history turned violent or led to civil unrest when relations between the government and people break down. Our efforts stress the need for productive engagement and seek to improve the capacity of civil society organizations, including expanding their skillsets to facilitate productive engagement.

Mission Goal 2: Improve Peace and Security

Description: Within the limits imposed by coup-related restrictions, partner with Burkinabe security agencies, including the military and the full spectrum of law enforcement, to improve the safety of all persons in the country, including the Burkinabe people, IDPs and refugees, and other foreign nationals including U.S. citizens. Counter transnational crime and violent extremism.

Objective 2.1: Within coup-related restrictions, build Burkinabe security forces' and law enforcement institutions' capacity to counter terrorism and maintain public order while respecting human rights and the rule of law.

- **Justification:** The violent extremism which has engulfed Burkina Faso since 2016 affects every aspect of life in the country and poses an existential threat to the state. It has exacerbated economic and humanitarian crises, eroded the social fabric and undermined the traditional of tolerance and peaceful coexistence on which the Burkinabe people pride themselves, and cost the lives of thousands of civilians and security force personnel. The Burkinabe security forces were ill-equipped to confront a transnational terrorism threat in 2016 and have made a concerted effort to pursue reforms, a process hindered by an increasingly dangerous security environment and growing attacks. Security forces have been accused of serious abuse and violations of international norms, not all of which have been fully investigated by the state. Over the past 10 years, we have established a strong bilateral security partnership with Burkina Faso that supports counterterrorism, peacekeeping operations, border security, and security sector reform. Particularly as our ability to provide direct assistance remains limited, Burkina Faso needs to significantly improve its ability to respond to threats.
- **Linkages:** This objective supports the State/USAID AF Joint Regional Strategy's Goal 2: Advance Mutual Peace and Security Interests.

- **Risks:** Failure by the security forces to improve in the fight against terrorism poses an existential risk to the Burkinabe state and to our ability to engage with the country. Within the bounds of engagement permissible post-coup, and taking into account the security forces' record on human rights, we will seek to maximize our engagement so as to prevent this outcome.

Objective 2.2: Strengthen the Burkinabe government's ability to effectively communicate its strategic goals and accomplishments in order to improve civil-military relations and foster broader social cohesion.

- **Justification:** Growing public frustration with their government's lack of progress in the fight against terrorism is one of the factors that created the environment in which the January 2022 coup d'état met with public acceptance. Exacerbating this frustration was the government's inability to effectively communicate its counter terrorism strategy or specific military operations and achievements. This has also resulted in a general degradation of the relationship between security forces and the Burkinabe population, which has only worsened as the fight intensifies and reports of abuses against minority and other civilian populations emerge without an effective government response. The transition government increasingly identifies the need for counter-insurgency strategies and tactics as the crisis continues and the number of Burkinabe fighters increases. Without improved civilian-military relations and official communications regarding the fight against terrorism, the country runs the risk of further instability caused by popular dissatisfaction.
- **Linkages:** This objective supports the State/USAID AF Joint Regional Strategy's Goal 2: Advance Mutual Peace and Security Interests.
- **Risks:** Poor public communications have a demonstrated ability to increase political instability in Burkina Faso. Our engagement with the transition government highlights this concern, which is shared by members of the regime.

Objective 2.3: Enhance Mission capabilities to protect and support the safety and security of U.S. citizens.

- **Justification:** The rapidly declining security situation has underscored the Mission's responsibilities to protect U.S. citizens living in and visiting Burkina Faso. The U.S. citizen population in Burkina Faso includes an estimated 2,000 people in country at any given time and is composed of dual-national children, missionaries and NGO workers, in addition to the official U.S. citizen community. To better prepare for possible future crises, we continue to maintain a willing warden network, and expand our network of local contacts in order to develop new interlocutors in the fields of security, health, and social work. We also will continue to conduct frequent crisis management exercises to ensure our response procedures are updated and practiced. Our goal and objectives also support a coordinated national effort to deny entry into the United States to individuals who threaten our national security. We maintain commitment to our security by facilitating cross-border movement of legitimate travelers through fraud detection efforts and vigilant adjudication of U.S. passports and visas. Through support for the Global Health Security Agenda, we protect the U.S. from public health threats, and support Burkina Faso's efforts to strengthen border health security, including detection and response of potential public health hazards at ports of entry and across shared borders (airports, border crossings, etc.).
- **Linkages:** This objective supports the State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan's Goal 5: Serve U.S. Citizens around the world and facilitate secure international travel.
- **Risks:** The degraded security environment poses a real threat to the lives of U.S. citizens in Burkina Faso. Monitoring for threats to U.S. interests is a primary mission for much of the Mission's personnel; any change in the situation or information regarding threats to U.S. citizens prompts an immediate response from across the inter-agency.

Mission Goal 3: Promote Equitable Development, Trade, and Economic Growth

Description: Focus on the fundamentals of health and food security as a foundation for greater economic growth and opportunity. Maximize U.S. trade opportunities in realization of the goal.

Objective 3.1: Foster economic opportunity, particularly for often marginalized populations, through increased U.S. trade and investment to increase economic wellbeing and reducing the primary driver of VEO and Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO) recruitment.

- **Justification:** Burkina Faso is among the world's poorest nations, ranking near the bottom of the Human Development Index. The largely agriculturally-based economy had averaged 5-6 percent annual growth until the dual shocks of the global pandemic and an increase in insecurity. Increasing the earning power of Burkinabe is fundamental to the country's development and, because a lack of opportunity is a key driver of VEO recruitment, to its security. The Second National Economic and Social Development Plan (PNDES-II), developed under the government of President Kabore, has not yet been fully adopted by the transition government, leaving USAID and other donors unable to align their efforts in the near-term with Burkina Faso's official development plan. Within its own programs, USAID works to ensure Burkinabe households will be more resilient to climate change-related shocks through agricultural and other economic activities. Targeting our efforts at marginalized populations such as ethnic minorities and women helps bolster social cohesion and equitable economic development, which further improves the population's ability to resist violent extremism.

Despite a handful of success stories, Burkina Faso still does not fully benefit from the trade preferences authorized under AGOA. The country's sizable gold reserves and exports such as cotton, cashews, and sesame offer possibilities for expanded economic cooperation, as do sectors such as technology and other services. The Economic Section will aim to enhance skills of the AGOA representatives and raise awareness about AGOA benefits. Using both exchange and English outreach programs, the Public Affairs Section

prepares Burkinabe to participate in the global market. The vibrant teacher-training program integrates English Language Fellows and Fulbright Language Specialists to improve overall teaching styles and curriculum that encourage debate, critical thinking, and conversation skills.

- **Linkages:** This objective supports the State/USAID AF Joint Regional Strategy's Goal 1: Increase Mutually Beneficial Economic Growth, Trade, and Investment; and Goal 4: Promote Inclusive Country-led Development.
- **Risks:** Durable success in our other objectives would be imperiled by a failure to improve the economic situation. Our response is wholistic and reflects the centrality of this objective to our long term objectives in, and bilateral relations with, Burkina Faso.

Objective 3.2: Assistance and development programs improve the health and nutrition of the people of Burkina Faso.

- **Justification:** Health determines whether parents can work to support their families, children can attend school, mothers can survive childbirth to nurture their children, and infants can grow and thrive. With strategic investments in public health in Burkina Faso, the United States will contribute to promote an enabling environment for economic development, job creation, education, agricultural development, gender equity, and political stability. The key programs that will move the Mission toward achievement of the above goals focus on the reduction of morbidity and mortality of malaria; increased access to family planning and reproductive health services; maternal and child health activities; focusing on improved nutritional status; expanding access to potable water; and enhancing the country's capacity to protect the population from infectious disease threats including neglected tropical diseases. Progress toward improved basic health conditions of the Burkinabe people is a key U.S. foreign policy goal. The inclusion of Burkina Faso as a Presidential Malaria Initiative (PMI) focus country since 2016 and the opening of a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) country office the same year has increased our technical support against the number one killer of children under five years old. Food for Peace, Feed the Future, and

McGovern/Dole Food for Education each include programming around better nutrition practices.

- **Linkages:** This objective supports the State/USAID AF Joint Regional Strategy's Goal 4: Promote Inclusive Country-led Development.
- **Risks:** Failure to improve health and nutrition outcomes for the Burkinabe people will leave the country increasingly vulnerable to instability and exogenous shocks. The importance of this goal is reflected in the percentage of our assistance budget devoted to these dual priorities.

Objective 3.3: Support transition government efforts to strengthen resilience to climate change, fight illicit trade, eliminate trafficking in persons and goods, and improve its capacity to collect taxes and other fees in order to promote sustainable economic growth.

- **Justification:** This goal reflects the challenges, both endogenous and exogenous, which hamper Burkina Faso's ability to sustainably develop and provide equitable economic opportunities for its people, particularly for marginalized communities and ethnic minorities. Improvement in the fight against corruption and trafficking will deliver much-needed revenue to a state budget taxed by the diversion of resources to the counterterrorism fight and complements our efforts to assist Burkina in pursuing economic growth. Burkina's geographic location makes large portions of its territory vulnerable to the effects of climate change, an exogenous shock the country is ill-equipped to manage at this stage.
- **Linkages:** This objective supports the State/USAID AF Joint Regional Strategy's Goal 1: Increase Mutually Beneficial Economic Growth, Trade, and Investment; and Goal 4: Promote Inclusive Country-led Development.
- **Risks:** Failure of the Burkinabe state to achieve the goals stated here would impact the country's development in a number of fields: lack of improvement in anti-corruption efforts could have negative political consequences given the importance of this issue to the population; failure to increase tax revenues will impair the transition government's ability to properly fund its programs. Our engagement highlights our belief that

providing targeted assistance to the most vulnerable as well as capacity building for state institutions will create a robust and more resilient Burkina Faso better able to withstand diminished progress in any one of these areas.

4. Management Objectives

Management Objective 1: Recruit and train a talented, capable, and diverse workforce of both American and Locally Employed Staff to support Mission goals and objectives.

- **Justification:** By May 2022 our Mission will have onboarded over 100 new Locally Employed Staff (LE Staff). Recruitment has therefore never been so crucial to address current and future staffing needs for a Mission in constant growth. 72% of these new positions are either guards or skilled workforce employees. The need for continued development as part of our onboarding and integration process remains a high priority. Management will continue to take the lead in providing new-hire orientation briefings and independent sessions targeting specific topics such as premium compensation. We will also continue to invest in our LE Staff community to obtain working knowledge of English, as determined by certain positions and will focus on providing our workforce with a more conceptual understanding of Department technology and applications. This can also be accomplished through management training and mentoring, which must become a standard tool for supervisors. This will allow employees to become more effective in their roles and aim to support Mission objectives by improving the Embassy's internal efficiency in three important areas.
- **Linkages:** This objective supports the Bureau of Human Resource's Goal 1- Recruit: Identify, attract engage with, and hire diverse, skilled, and competitive prospects and candidates with the skills to advance U.S. values, interests, and goals at home and around the world.
- **Risks:** An insufficient workforce will prevent us from achieving any of the objectives we set.

Management Objective 2: Obtain the necessary resources and continue staff recruitment to effectively manage transition and growth, thereby providing a robust platform to support the Embassy's growing footprint.

- **Justification:** The Mission continues to experience added Mission and associated personnel since the construction of the NEC in 2008. In 2008, there were 14 direct hire or full-time equivalent (FTE) staff and 222 Locally Employed Staff. By May 2022, there will be 54 FTEs, 567 LE Staff, and anywhere from 50-60 temporary duty personnel at any given time. This continued growth not only requires a comprehensive effort on behalf of Facilities Management to keep up with pressing needs on tight sizing, but it also presents a strain on Management's ability to provide adequate programs and services to include housing for USDH staff on NSDD-38 positions. Management teams are working hard to accommodate the ongoing demands anywhere from recruitment to housing accommodations. In addition, the challenges of adding new employees to include TDY staff into the chancery and compound go beyond desk spaces. All associated utilities, including communications infrastructure, electrical and HVAC, need to be considered. Availability of adequate parking has also become a subject of concern for mission personnel.
- **Linkages:** This objective supports several goals within Functional Bureau Strategies within the Management family, including the Bureau of Overseas Building Operation's Goal 2: Provide a functional platform for diplomacy that represents the best in American innovation, design, engineering, construction, planning, real property and portfolio management, technology, art, and culture; and the Bureau of Human Resource's Goal 1- Recruit: Identify, attract engage with, and hire diverse, skilled, and competitive prospects and candidates with the skills to advance U.S. values, interests, and goals at home and around the world.
- **Risks:** The Mission's efficiency and efficacy would be directly challenged by a failure to achieve this objective.